In
The Beginning...
SR-71
Stealth BLACKBIRD!
"The Seeker of Truth,
That Is Without Peer or Equal"
This is what the Habu's, the Air Force pilots of the SR-71,
said of their purpose and what their mission was all
about.
Before I go any
further here, I know I am treading on some strong
feelings & convictions. Let me say this up front. Yes, I believe in
the
Almighty & I further believe with all my heart & soul that the
heavens are
teaming with life and that at least 99% of that life is
much further along and advance of our
own.
Having said that, I also believe through personal
knowledge and
access to a lot of classified records, that we on earth have never
in its known existence
been visited by ANY intelligent life and
furthermore there does not exist
in any known location so much
as one shred of evidence to the contrary. I sincerely
wish I could
have better news to report here, but that would not be truthful
to
you
or to me.
Further to the above...
YES,
this
does include Roswell 47, Eglin, Wright-Pat, Groom Lake.
Majestic and
A-12 OXCART
and the UFO Conspiracy Theory
November 1954, CIA had entered into the world of high technology with
its U-2 overhead reconnaissance project. Working with Lockheed's Advanced
Development facility in Burbank, California, known as the Skunk Works, and
Kelly Johnson, an experimental aircraft: the U-2. It could fly at 60,000 feet;
in the mid-1950's, most commercial airliners flew between 10,000 feet and
20,000 feet. Consequently, once the U-2 started test flights, pilots and air
traffic controllers began reporting a large increase in UFO sightings. The early
U-2s were silver (they were later painted black) and reflected the rays from
the sun, especially at sunrise & sunset. They often appeared as fiery objects
to observers below. Air Force BLUE BOOK investigators aware of the secret
U-2 flights tried to explain away such sightings by linking them to natural
phenomena such as ice crystals and temperature inversions. By checking with
the Agency's U-2 Project Staff in Washington, BLUE BOOK investigators were
able to attribute many UFO sightings to U-2 flights. They were careful, however,
not to reveal the true cause of the sighting to the public. According to later
estimates from CIA officials who worked on the U-2 project and the OXCART
(SR-71, or Blackbird) project, over half of all UFO reports from the late 1950s
through the 1960s were accounted for by manned reconnaissance flights
(namely the U-2) over the United States. This led the Air Force to make
misleading and deceptive statements to the public in order to allay public
fears and to protect an extraordinarily sensitive national security assets.
While perhaps justified, this deception added fuel to the later conspiracy
theories and the cover-up controversy of the 1970s. The percentage of what
the Air Force considered unexplained UFO sightings fell to 5.9 release of the
Robertson panel report on UFOs. In 1956, Edward Ruppelt, former head of
the Air Force BLUE BOOK project, publicly revealed the existence of the
panel. A best-selling book by UFOlogist Donald Keyhoe, a retired Marine Corps
major, advocated release of all government information relating to UFOs.
Civilian UFO groups such as the National Investigations Committee on Aerial
Phenomena (NICAP) and the Aerial Phenomena Research Organization (APRO)
immediately pushed for release of the Robertson panel report. Under pressure,
the Air Force approached CIA for permission to declassify and release the
report. Despite such pressure, Philip Strong, Deputy Assistant Director of OSI,
refused to declassify the report & declined to disclose CIA sponsorship of the
panel. As an alternative, the Agency prepared a sanitized version of the report
potential in the UFO controversy. The demands, however, for more government
information about UFOs did not let up. On 8 March 1958, Keyhoe, in an interview
with Mr. Mike Wallace of CBS, claimed deep CIA involvement with UFOs & CIA
sponsorship of the Robertson panel. This prompted letters to the Agency from
Keyhoe and Dr. Leon Davidson, a chemical engineer and UFOlogist. They
demanded the release of the full Robertson panel report & confirmation of CIA
involvement in the UFO issue. Davidson had convinced himself that the Agency,
not the Air Force, carried most of the responsibility for UFO analysis and that
"the activities of the US Government are responsible for the flying saucer
sightings of the last decade." Indeed, because of the undisclosed U-2 and
OXCART flights, Davidson was closer to the truth than he suspected. CIA,
nevertheless held firm to its policy of not revealing its role in UFO investigations
and refused to declassify the full Robertson panel report. In a meeting with Air
Force representatives to discuss how to handle future inquires such as Keyhoe's
and Davidson's, Agency officials confirmed their opposition to the declassification
of the full report and worried that Keyhoe had the ear of former DCI VAdm.
Roscoe Hillenkoetter, who served on the board of governors of NICAP. They
debated whether to have CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston show
Hillenkoetter the report as a possible way to defuse the situation. CIA officer
Frank Chapin also hinted that Davidson might have ulterior motives, "some of
them perhaps not in the best interest of this country," and suggested bringing
in the FBI to investigate. Although the record is unclear whether the FBI ever
instituted an investigation of Davidson or Keyhoe, or even whether Houston ever
saw Hillenkoetter about the Robertson report, but in the end Hillenkoetter did
resign from the NICAP in 1962.
The Agency was also involved with Davidson and Keyhoe in two rather famous
UFO cases in the 1950s, which helped contribute to a growing sense of public
distrust of CIA with regard to UFOs. One focused on what was reported to have
been a tape recording of a radio signal from a flying saucer; the other on
reported photos of a flying saucer. The "radio code" incident began innocently
enough in 1955, when two elderly sisters in Chicago, Mildred & Marie Maier,
reported in the Journal of Space Flight their experiences with UFOs, including
the recording of a radio program in which an unidentified code was reportedly
heard. The sisters taped the program and other ham radio operators also claimed
to have heard the "space message." OSI became interested and asked the
Scientific Contact Branch to obtain a copy of the recording. Field officers from the
Contact Division (CD), one of whom was Dewelt Walker, made contact with the
Maier sisters, who were "thrilled that the government was interested," and set up
a time to meet with them. In trying to secure the tape recording,
the Agency officers reported that they had stumbled upon a scene from Arsenic
and Old Lace. "The only thing lacking was the elderberry wine," Walker cabled
Headquarters. After reviewing the sisters' scrapbook of clippings from their days
on the stage, the officers secured a copy of the recording. OSI analyzed the tape
and found it was nothing more than Morse code from a US radio station. The matter
rested until UFO-ologist Leon Davidson talked with the Maier sisters in 1957. The
sisters remembered they had talked with a Mr. Walker who said he was from the
US Air Force. Davidson then wrote to a Mr. Walker, believing him to be a US Air
Force Intelligence Officer from OSI at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio and to ask if the
tape had been analyzed at ATIC. Dewelt Walker replied to Davidson that the tape
had been forwarded to proper authorities for evaluation, and no information was
available concerning the results. Not satisfied, and suspecting that Walker was
really a CIA officer, Davidson next wrote DCI Allen Dulles demanding to learn what
the coded message revealed and who Mr. Walker was.
The Agency, wanting to keep Walker's identity as a CIA agent a secret, replied that
another agency of the government had analyzed the tape in question and that
Davidson would be hearing from the Air Force. On 5th August, the Air Force wrote
Davidson saying that Walker "was and is an Air Force Officer" and that the tape
"was analyzed by another government organization."
The Air Force letter confirmed the recording contained only identifiable Morse
code which came from a known US-licensed radio station. Davidson wrote Dulles
again. This time he wanted to know the identity of the Morse operator and of the
agency that had conducted the analysis. CIA and the Air Force were now in a
quandary. The Agency had previously denied that it had actually analyzed the tape.
The Air Force had also denied analyzing the tape and claimed that Walker
was an Air Force officer. CIA officers, under cover, contacted Davidson in
Chicago and promised to get the code translation and the identification of
the transmitter, if possible. In another attempt to pacify Davidson, a CIA
officer, again under cover and wearing his Air Force uniform, contacted
Davidson in New York City. The CIA officer explained that there was no
super agency involved and that Air Force policy was not to disclose who was
doing what. Seeming to accept this argument, Davidson nevertheless pressed
for disclosure of the recording message and the source. The officer agreed to
see what he could do. After checking Headquarters, the CIA officer phoned
Davidson to report that a thorough check had been made and, because the
signal was of known US origin, the tape and the notes made at the time had
been destroyed to conserve file space. Incensed over what he then perceived
was a runaround, Davidson told the CIA officer that "he & his agency,
whichever, were acting like Jimmy Hoffa and the Teamster Union in destroying
records which might indict them." Believing that any contact with Davidson
would only encourage more speculation, the Contact Division washed its hands
of the issue by reporting to the DCI and to ATIC that it would not respond to or
try to contact Davidson again. Thus, a minor, rather bizarre incident, handled
poorly by both CIA and the Air Force, turned into a major flap that added fuel
to the growing mystery surrounding UFOs and CIA's role in their investigation.
Another flap a few months later added to the growing questions surrounding
the Agency's true role with regard to flying saucers. CIA's concern over secrecy
again made matters worse. In 1958, Major Keyhoe charged that the Agency was
deliberately asking eyewitnesses of UFOs not to make their sightings public. The
incident stemmed from a November 1957 request from OSI to the CD to obtain
from Ralph C. Mayher, a photographer for KYW-TV in Philadelphia, certain
photographs he took in 1952 of an unidentified flying object. Harry Real, a CD
officer, contacted Mayher and obtained copies of the photographs for analysis.
On 12 December 1957, John Hazen, another CD officer, returned the five photos
of the alleged UFO to Mayher without comment. Mayher asked Hazen for the
Agency's evaluation of the photos, explaining that he was trying to organize a
TV program to brief the public on UFOs. He wanted to mention on the show that
a US intelligence organization had viewed the photographs and thought them of
interest. Although he advised Mayher not to take this approach, Hazen stated
that Mayher was a US citizen and would have to make his own decision as to
what to do. Keyhoe later contacted Mayher, who told him his story of CIA and
the photographs. Keyhoe then asked the Agency to confirm Hazen's employment
in writing, in an effort to expose CIA's role in UFO investigations. The Agency
refused, despite the fact that CD field representatives were normally overt and
carried credentials identifying their Agency association. DCI Dulles's aide, John
Earman, merely sent Keyhoe a noncommittal letter noting that, because UFOs
were of primary concern to the Department of the Air Force, the Agency had
referred his letter to the Air Force for an appropriate response. Like the response
to Davidson, the Agency reply to Keyhoe only fueled the speculation that the
Agency was deeply involved in UFO sightings. Pressure to release information
on UFOs continued to grow. Although CIA had a declining interest in UFO cases,
it continued to monitor UFO sightings. Officials felt the need to keep informed on
UFOs if only to alert the DCI to the more sensational UFO reports and flaps.
-
Genesis of CIA
& the OXCART Aircraft
KEY: (U) Unclassified
(C) Classified since declassified
(S) Secret since declassified
(TS) Top Secret since declassified
all thanks to the Freedom Of Information Act.
In the beginning.... THE OXCART STORY
compiled by Thomas P. McIninch (CIA)
(S) One spring day in 1962 a test pilot named Louis Schalk, employed by
the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, took off from the Nevada desert in an
aircraft the likes of which had never been seen before. A casual observer
would have been startled by the appearance of this vehicle; he would
perhaps have noticed especially its extremely long, slim, shape, its two
enormous jet engines, its long sharp, projecting nose, and its swept-back
wings which appeared far too short to support the fuselage in flight. He
might well have realized that this was a revolutionary airplane; he could
not have known that it would be able to fly at three times the speed of
sound for more than 3,000 miles without refueling, or that toward the end
of its flight, when fuel began to run low, it could cruise at over 90,000 feet.
Still less would he have known of the equipment it was to carry, or of the
formidable problems attending its design and construction.
(U) There was, of course, no casual observer present. The aircraft had been
designed and built for reconnaissance; it was projected as a successor to the
U-2. Its development had been carried out in profound secrecy. Despite the
numerous designers, engineers, skilled and unskilled workers, administrators
and others who had been involved in the affair, no authentic accounts, and
indeed scarcely any accounts at all, had leaked. Many aspects have not been
revealed to this day, and many are likely to remain classified for some time.
(S) The official designation of the aircraft was A-12. By a sort of inspired
perversity, however, it came to be called OXCART, a code word also applied
to the program under which it was developed. The secrecy in which it was so
long shrouded has lifted a bit and the purpose of this article is to give some
account of the inception, development, operation, and untimely demise of this
remarkable airplane. The OXCART no longer flies, but it has left a legacy of
technological achievement which points the way to new projects. It became
the progenitor of a similar but somewhat less sophisticated reconnaissance
vehicle called the SR-71 by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and whose
existence is well known to press and public.
Sequel to the U-2
(S) The U-2 dated from 1954 & its development began under the direction
of a group headed by Richard M. Bissell of CIA. In June 1956, the aircraft
became operational, but officials predicted that its useful lifetime over the
USSR could hardly be much more than 18 months or two years. Its first
flight over Soviet territory revealed that the defense warning system not
only detected but tracked it quite accurately.
Yet, it remained a unique and (S) invaluable source of intelligence information
for almost four years, until on 1 May 1960, Francis Gary Powers was shot
down near Sverdlovsk. (U) Meanwhile, even as the U-2 commenced its active
career, efforts were under way to make it less vulnerable. The hope was to
reduce the vehicle's radar cross-section, so that it became less susceptible
to detection. New developments in radar-absorbing materials were tried and
achieved considerable success, though not enough to solve the problem.
Various far-out designs were explored, most of them seeking to create an
aircraft capable of flying at extremely high altitudes, though still at relatively
slow speed. However, none of them proved practicable. (S) Eventually, in the
fall of 1957, Bissell arranged with a contractor for a job of operations analysis
to determine how far the probability of shooting down an airplane varied
respectively with the plane's speed, altitude, and radar cross section. This
analysis demonstrated that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of
detection by radar. The probability of being shot down was not of course
reduced to zero, but it was evident that the supersonic line of approach was
worth serious consideration. Then from this time on, attention focused
increasingly on the possibility of building a vehicle which could fly at extremely
high speeds as well as great altitudes, and which would also incorporate the
best that could be attained in radar absorbing capabilities. Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation and Convair Division of General Dynamics were both informed of
the general requirements, and their designers set out to work on the problem
without as yet receiving any contract or funds from the government.
The fall of 1957 to late 1958 these designers constantly refined and adapted
their respective schemes. (S) Bissell realized that development and production
of such an aircraft would be exceedingly expensive, and that in the early stages
at least it would be doubtful whether the project could succeed. But, to secure
the necessary funds for such a program, high officials would have to receive the
best and most authoritative presentation of whatever prospects might unfold.
Accordingly, he got together a panel consisting of two distinguished authorities
on aero-dynamics and one physicist, with none other than the Russian Jewish
immigrant Dr. Edwin M. Land of the Polaroid Corporation as chairman. This was
a strange irony as one of the reasons besides religious persecution was the
common European thinking at the time was Jews could not be trusted for military
service or did not have anything to contribute. Nobel, Einstein and Rickover
seems to have change that. Between 1957 and 1959 this panel met about six
times, usually in Land's office in Cambridge, which was located on the grounds
of MIT. The Lockheed and Convair designers attended many parts of the
sessions. So did the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy concerned
with research and development, together with one or two of their technical
advisors. One useful consequence of the participation of service representatives
was that bureaucratic and jurisdictional feuds were reduced virtually to nil.
Throughout the program both Air Force and Navy gave valuable assistance and
cooperation. (S) As the months went by, the general outlines of what might be
done took shape in the minds of those concerned. Late in November 1958, the
members of the panel held a crucial meeting. They agreed that it now appeared
feasible to build an aircraft of such speed and altitude as to be very difficult to
track by radar. They recommended that the president be asked to approve in
principle a further prosecution of the project, to make funds available for
further studies and tests. The president and his Scientific Advisor, Dr. James
Killian were already aware of what was happening and when CIA officials went to
them with the recommendations of the panel they received a favorable hearing.
President Eisenhower gave his approval. Lockheed and Convair were then asked
to submit definite proposals, funds were made available to them, and the project
took on the code name GUSTO.
(C) Less than a year later the two proposals were essentially complete, and on
the 20 July 1959, the President was again briefed. This time he gave final
approval, which signified that the program could get fully under way. (C) The
next major step was to choose between the Lockheed and Convair designs. On
20 August 1959 specifications of the two proposals were submitted to a joint
DOD / USAF / CIA selection panel:
-
And The Winner...
(S) The Lockheed design was selected, Project GUSTO terminated, and the
program to develop a new U-2 follow-on aircraft was names OXCART. On 3
September 1959, CIA authorized Lockheed to proceed with antiradar studies,
aerodynamic structural tests, and engineering designs. On 30 January 1960
gave the green light to produce the first 12 aircraft.
Hence First Dozen Craft = A-12 designation!
(S) Pratt/Whitney Division of United Aircraft Corporation had been involved
in discussions of the project, and undertook to develop the propulsion system.
Their J-58 engine, which was to be used in the A-12, had been sponsored
originally by the US Navy for its own purposes, and was to be capable of a
speed of Mach 3.0. Navy interest in the development was diminishing, however,
and the Secretary of Defense had decided to withdraw from the program at the
end of 1959. CIA's requirement was that the engine and aircraft be further
developed and optimized for a speed of Mach 3.2. The new contract called for
initial assembly of three advanced experimental engines for both durability and
reliability testing, and provision of three engines for experimental flight testing
in early 1961. (S) Primary camera manufacturer was Perkin-Elmer. Because of
the extreme complexity of the design, however, a decision was soon made that
a back-up system might be necessary in the event the Perkin-Elmer design ran
into production problems & Eastman Kodak was also asked to build a camera
which was personally recommended by Edwin Land! Minneapolis-Honeywell
Corporation was selected to provide both the inertial navigation and automatic
flight control system. The Firewell Corp. & the David Clark Corporation were
the prime sources of pilot equipment and associated life support hardware.
(U) Lockheed's chief designer was Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson, creator of the
U-2 and he called his new vehicle not A-12 but A-11. Its design exhibited many
innovations. Supersonic airplanes, however, involve a multitude of extremely
difficult design problems. Their payload-range performance is highly sensitive
to engine weight, structural weight, fuel consumption, and aero dynamic efficiency.
Small mistakes in predicting these values; lead to large errors in performance.
Models of the A-11 were then tested and retested, adjusted & readjusted,
during thousands of hours in the wind tunnel. Johnson was confident of his
design, but no one could say positively whether the bird would fly, still less
whether it fulfilled the extremely demanding requirements laid down for it. (U)
To make the drawings & test the model was one thing; to build the aircraft was
another. The most numerous problems arose from the simple fact that in
flying through the atmosphere at its designed speed the skin of the aircraft
would be subjected to a temperature of more than 550 degrees Fahrenheit.
For one thing, no metal hitherto commonly used in aircraft production could
with stand this temperature, and those which would do so were for the most
part too heavy to be suitable for the purpose in hand. (S) During the design
phase Lockheed evaluated many materials & finally chose an alloy of titanium,
characterized by great strength, relatively light weight and good resistance to
high temperatures. Titanium was also scarce & very costly. Methods for milling
it & controlling the quality of the product were not fully developed. Of the early
deliveries from Titanium Metals Corporation some 80 % had to be rejected and
it was not until 1961, when a delegation from headquarters visited the officials
of that company, informed them of the objectives & high priority of the OXCART
program and gained their full cooperation, that the supply became consistently
satisfactory. (S) But this only solved an initial problem. One of the virtues of
titanium was its exceeding hardness, but this very virtue gave rise to immense
difficulties in machining and shaping the material. Even drills which worked well
on aluminum soon broke to pieces; new ones had to be devised. Assembly line
production was impossible; each of the small OXCART fleet was, so to speak,
turned out by hand. The cost of the program mounted well above original
estimates, and it soon began to run behind schedule. One after another,
however, the problems were solved, and their solution constituted perhaps the
greatest single technological achievement of the entire enterprise. Henceforth
it became practicable, if expensive, to build the aircraft out of titanium.
(S) Since every additional pound of weight was critical, adequate insulation
was out of the question. The inside of the aircraft would be like a moderately
hot oven. The pilot would have to wear a kind of space suit, with its own cooling
apparatus, pressure control, oxygen supply & other necessities for survival.
The fuel tanks, which constituted by far the greater part of the aircraft,
would heat up to about 350 degrees, so that special fuel had to be supplied
and the tanks themselves rendered inert with nitrogen. Lubricating oil was
formulated for operation at 600 degrees F., and contained a diluent in order
to remain fluid at operation below 40 degrees. Insulation on the plane's
intricate wiring soon became brittle and useless. During the lifetime of the
OXCART no better insulation was found; the wiring & related connectors had
to be given special attention at great cost in labor and in time.
(S) Then there was the unique problem of the camera window. The OXCART
was to carry a delicate and highly sophisticated camera as its main mission,
which would look out through a quartz glass window. The effectiveness of the
whole system depended upon achieving freedom from optical distortion
despite the great heat to which the window would be subjected. Thus the
question was not simply one of providing equipment with resistance to high
temperature, but assuring there should be no unevenness of temperature
throughout the area of the window. It took three years of time and 2 million
dollars of money to arrive a satisfactory solution. The program scored one of
its most remarkable successes when the quartz glass was successfully fused
to its metal frame by an unprecedented process involving the use of high
frequency sound waves. (S) Another major problem of different nature was
to achieve the low radar cross-section desired. The airframe areas giving the
greatest radar return were the vertical stabilizers, the engine inlet, and the
forward side of the engine nacelles. Research in ferrite's, high temperature
absorbing materials and high temperature plastic structures was undertaken
to find methods to reduce the return. Eventually the vertical tail section fins
were constructed from a kind of laminated type "plastic" material-the first
time that such a material had been used for an important part of an aircraft's
structure. Such changes in structural materials, the A-11 was re-designated
A-12, and as such has never been publicly disclosed.
(C) To test the effectiveness of antiradar devices a small-scale model is
inadequate; only a full-size mock-up will do. Lockheed accordingly built one
of these as early as November 1959, transported it in a specially designed
trailer truck over hundreds of miles of highway from the Burbank plant to
the test area. Here it was hoisted to the top of a pylon and looked at from
various angles by radar. Tests and adjustments went on for a year before
the results were deemed satisfactory. In the course of the process it was
found desirable to attach some sizable metallic constructions on each side
of the fuselage and Kelly Johnson worried a good deal about the effect of
these protuberances on his design. In flight tests, it later developed that
they imparted a useful aerodynamic lift to the vehicle, and years afterward
Lockheed's design for a supersonic transport embodied similar structures.
(S) Pilots for the OXCART would obviously have to be quite extraordinary
competence, not only because of the unprecedented performance of the
aircraft itself, but also because of the particular qualities needed in men
who were to fly these intelligence type missions. Brigadier General Don
Littman, of the Air Force, was designated to draw up the criteria for
selection, with advice from Kelly Johnson & even from CIA Headquarters.
Pilots had to be qualified in the latest high performance fighters, they had
to be emotionally stable, and well motivated. They were to be between 25
and 40 years of age, and the size of the A-12 cockpit prescribed that they
be under six feet tall and under 175 pounds in weight.
(S) Air Force files were screened for possible candidates and a list of pilots
obtained. Psychological assessments, physical examinations & refinement
of criteria eliminated a good many. Pre-evaluation processing resulted in 16
potential nominees. This group underwent a further intensive security and
medical scrutiny by the Agency. Those who remained were then approached
to take employment with the Agency on a highly classified project involving a
very advanced aircraft. In November 1961, commitments were obtained from
five of the group. The small number recruited at this stage required that a
second search be undertaken. (S) When the final screening was complete the
pilots selected from the program were William L. Skliar, Kenneth S. Collins,
Walter Ray, Lon Walter, Mele Vojvodich, Jack W. Weeks, Ron "Jack" Layton,
Dennis B. Sullivan, David P. Young, Francis Murray, and Russell Scott. Right
after the selection, arrangements were made with the Air Force to effect
appropriate transfers and assignments to cover their training and to lay the
basis for their transition from military to civilian status. Compensation and
insurance arrangements were similar to those for the U-2 pilots.
(U) One thing to be decided in the earliest stages of the program was where
to base and test the aircraft. Lockheed clearly could not do the business at
Burbank, where the aircraft were being built, if for no other reason that its
runway was short. The ideal location ought to be remote from metropolitan
areas; well away from civil and military airways to preclude observation;
easily accessible by air; blessed with good weather the year round; capable
of accommodating large numbers of personnel; equipped with fuel storage
facilities; fairly close to an Air Force installation; and possessing at least an
8,000 foot runway. There was no such place to be found.
(S) Ten Air Force bases programmed for closure were considered, but none
provided the necessary security and the annual operating costs at most of
them would be unacceptable. Edwards Air Force Base in California seemed
a more likely candidate, but in the end it also was passed over. Instead a
secluded site in Nevada was finally picked. It was deficient in personnel
accommodations and POL storage, its long unused runway was inadequate,
but security was good, or could be made so, and a moderate construction
program could provide sufficient facilities. Lockheed then estimated what
would be needed in such respects as monthly fuel consumption, hangars and
shop space, housing for personnel and runway specifications. Armed with
the list of major requirements, Headquarters came up with a construction
and engineering plan. And in case anyone became curious about what was
going on at this remote spot, a cover story stated that the facilities were
being prepared for certain radar studies, to be conducted by an engineering
firm with support from the Air Force. The remote location was explained as
necessary to reduce the effect of electronic interference by outside sources.
(S) Excellent as it may have been from the point of view of security, the site
at first afforded few of the necessities and none of the amenities of life. It
was far from any metropolitan center. Lockheed provided a non descript
C-47 as shuttle service to its home plant at Burbank and a chartered D-18
(Lodestar) furnished transportation to Las Vegas. Daily commuting was out
of the question, however & the construction workers arriving during 1960
were billeted in surplus trailers. New water wells were dug and a few
recreational facilities provided, but it was some time before any of the
accommodations became agreeable. **
(** This footnote did NOT appear in the original document. It is the method I will use
to indicate marginal notes that were hand written, at the location of '**' in the original
document. The marginal note states: (1955) (S) Among the lesser snags, one existed
because the laws of Nevada required the names of all contractor personnel staying in
the state for more than 48 hours to be reported to state authorities. It was generally
felt that to list all these names and identify the companies involved would be likely to
give the whole show away. The Agency's General Counsel, however, discovered that
Government employees were exempted from these requirements. Thenceforth all
contractor personnel going to the site received appointments as paid Government
consultants, and if questions were asked the reply could be that no one but official
government employees were at this site.
(C) Construction began in September 1960, and continued on a double
shift schedule until mid 1964. One of the most urgent tasks was to build
the runway, which according to initial estimates of A-12 requirements
must be 8,500 feet long. The existing asphalt runway was 5,000 feet
long and incapable of supporting the weight of the A-12. The new one
was built between 7 September and 15 November and involved pouring
over 25,000 yards of concrete. Another problem was to provide some
500,000 gallons of PF-1 aircraft fuel per month. Neither storage facilities
nor means of transporting fuel existed. After considering the use of airlift,
pipeline and truck transport, it was decided that the last named was the
most economical, and could be made feasible by resurfacing no more than
eighteen miles of highway leading into the base.
(C) Three surplus Navy hangars were obtained, dismantled, and erected
on the north side of the base. Over 100 surplus Navy housing buildings
were transported to the base and made ready for occupancy. By early
1962 a fuel tank farm was ready, with a capacity of 1,320,000 gallons.
Warehousing and shop space was begun and repairs made to older
buildings. All this, together with the many other facilities that had to be
provided, took a long time to complete. Meanwhile, however, the really
essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery date of
Aircraft #1 in Aug 1961.
(S) Facilities were ready, but the aircraft were not. Originally promised
for delivery at the end of May 1961, the date first slipped to August,
largely because of Lockheed's difficulties in procuring and fabricating
titanium. Then Pratt & Whitney found unexpectedly great trouble in
bringing the J-58 engine up to the OXCART requirements.
In March 1961, Kelly Johnson notified Headquarters: (U) "Schedules
are in jeopardy on two fronts. One is the assembly of the wing and the
other is in satisfactory development of the engine. Our evaluation shows
that each of these programs is from (S) three to four months behind the
current schedule." To this Bissell replied: (U) "I have learned of your
expected additional delay in 1st flight from 30 August to 1 December 61.
This news is extremely shocking on top of our previous slippage from May
to August and my understanding as of our meeting 19 Dec '61 that the
titanium extrusion problems were essentially overcome. I trust this is the
last disappointment short of a severe Burbank earthquake."
(U) Realizing that delays were causing the cost of the program to soar,
Headquarters decided to place a top-level aeronautical engineer in
residence at Lockheed to monitor the program & submit progress reports.
(C) Delays nevertheless persisted. On 11 September, Pratt and Whitney
informed Lockheed of their continuing difficulties with the J-58 engine in
terms of weight, delivery, and performance. Completion date for #1
aircraft by now had slipped to 22 December 1961, and the first flight to
27 February 1962. Even on this last date the J-58 would not be ready, it
was therefore decided that a Pratt and Whitney J-75 engine, designed for
the F-105 & flown in the U-2, should be used for early flights. The engine,
with other components, could be fitted to the A-12 airframe, and it could
power the aircraft safely to altitudes up to 50,000 feet & at speeds up to
Mach 1.6. (S) When this decision had been made, final preparations were
begun for the testing phase. In late 1961 Colonel Robert J. Holbury, USAF,
was named Commander of the base, with the Agency employee as his his
Deputy. Support aircraft began arriving in the spring of 1962. These did
include eight F-101's for training, two T-33's for proficiency flying, a C-130
for any cargo transport, a U-3A for administration purposes, a helicopter
for search and rescue and a Cessna- 180 for liaison use. Additionally,
Lockheed provided an F-104 to act as chase aircraft during the A-12 flight
test period. (S) Meanwhile in January 1962, an agreement was reached
with the Federal Aviation Agency that expanded all the restricted airspace
in the vicinity of the test area. Certain FAA air traffic controllers were
cleared for the OXCART Project; their function was to insure that aircraft
did not violate the order. The North American Air Defense Command
established procedures to prevent their radar stations from reporting the
appearance of high performance aircraft on their radar scopes.
(S) Refueling concepts required pre-positioning of vast quantities of fuel at
certain points outside the United States.
Special tank farms were programmed in California, Eielson AFB Alaska,
Thule AB Greenland, Kadena AB Okinawa, and Adana AB, Turkey.
Since the A-12 use specially refined fuel, these tank farms were reserved
exclusively for use by the OXCART Program. Very small detachments of
technicians at these locations maintained the fuel storage facility and
arranged for periodic quality control fuel tests.
(S) At the Lockheed Burbank plant, Aircraft No. 1 (serially numbered 121)
received its final tests and checkout during January and February 1962,
and was partially disassembled for shipment to the site. It became clear
very early in OXCART planning that because of security problems and the
inadequate runway, the A-12 could not fly from Burbank. Movement of the
full-scale (S) radar test model was successfully accomplished in November
1959, as described above. A thorough survey of the route in June 1961,
ascertained the hazards and problems of moving the actual aircraft and
showed that a package measuring 35 feet wide and 105 feet long could be
transported without major difficulty. Obstructing road signs were removed,
trees trimmed and some roadsides leveled. Appropriate arrangements were
made with police authorities and local officials to help accomplish the safe
transport of the aircraft. The entire fuselage, minus wings was crated,
covered & loaded on the special trailer, which cost about $100,000.
On 26 Feb 1962, it departed Burbank, and arrived at the base.
(S) First Flights
(U) Upon arrival reassembly of the aircraft and installation of the J-75
engines began. Soon it was found that aircraft tank sealing compounds
had failed to adhere to the metals, and when fuel was put into the tanks
numerous leaks occurred. It was then necessary to strip the tanks of the
faulty sealing compounds and reline them with new materials.
Thus occurred 1 more unexpected AND exasperating delay in the program.
(U) Finally, on 26 April 1962, Aircraft 121 was ready. On that day in
accordance with Kelly Johnson's custom, Louis Schalk took it for an
unofficial, unannounced, maiden flight lasting some 40 minutes. As in all
maiden flights minor problems were detected, but it took only four more
days to ready the aircraft for its first official flight. (U) On 30 April 1962,
just under one year later than originally planned, the A-12 officially lifted
her wheels from the runway. Piloted again by Louis Schalk, it took off at
170 knots, with a gross weight of 72,000 pounds and climbed to 30,000'.
Top speed was 340 knots and the flight lasted 59 minutes. The pilot
reported that the aircraft responded well and was extremely stable.
Kelly Johnson declared it to be the smoothest official first flight of any
aircraft he had designed or tested. The aircraft broke the sound barrier
on its second official flight, 4 May 62 reaching Mach 1.1. Again only minor
problems were reported.
(S) With these flights accomplished, jubilation was the order of the day.
New Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. John McCone, sent a telegram
congratulating Kelly Johnson. A critical phase had triumphantly passed,
but there remained the long, difficult and sometimes discouraging process
of working the aircraft up to full operational performance.
Braking would be by a drouge chute
(C) Aircraft No. 122 arrived at base on 26 June, & spent three months in
radar testing before engine installations and final assembly. Aircraft #123
arrived in August and flew in October. Aircraft #124, a two-seated version
intended for use in training project pilots, was delivered in November.
It was powered by the J-58 engines, but delivery delays and a desire to
begin pilot training prompted a decision to install the smaller J-75's. The
trainer (SR71B/A-12B) flew initially in January 1963. The fifth aircraft,
Number 125, arrived at the area on 17 December. (S) Meanwhile the
OXCART program received a shot in the arm from the Cuban missile crisis.
U-2's had been maintaining a regular reconnaissance vigil over the island
and it was on one of these missions in October that the presence of
offensive missiles was discovered. Over flights thereafter became more
frequent, but on 27 October an Agency U-2, flown by a Strategic Air Force
pilot on a SAC directed mission, was shot down by a surface-to-air missile.
This raised the dismaying possibility that continued manned, high- altitude
surveillance of Cuba might become out of the question. The Oxcart program
suddenly assumed greater significance than ever, and its achievement of
operational status became one of the highest national priorities.
(S) At the end of 1962 there were two A-12 aircraft engaged in flight tests.
A speed of Mach 2.16 and altitude of 60,000 feet had been achieved.
Progress was still slow, however, because of delays in the delivery of engines
and shortcomings in the performance of those delivered. One of the two test
birds was still flying with two J-75 engines and the other with one a J-75 and
a J-58. It had become clear that Pratt & Whitney had been too optimistic in
their forecast; the problem of developing the J-58 up to OXCART then
specifications had proved a good deal more recalcitrant than expected. Mr.
McCone judged the situation to be truly serious, and on 3 December he wrote
to the President of United Aircraft Corporation. (U) "I have been advised
that J-58 engine deliveries have been delayed again due to engine control
production problems....By the end of the year it appears we will have barely
enough J-58 engines to support the flight test program adequately. Due to
various engine difficulties we have not yet reached design speed and altitude.
Engine thrust and fuel consumption deficiencies at present prevent sustained
flight at design conditions which is necessary to complete developments.
(U) By the end of January 1963, ten engines were available, and the first
flight with two of them installed occurred on 15 January. Thenceforth all
A-12 aircraft were fitted with their intended propulsion system. Flight testing
accelerated and contractor personnel went to a three-shift work day. (U) With
each succeeding step into a high Mach regime new problems presented
themselves. The worst of all these difficulties, indeed one of the most
formidable in the entire history of the program was revealed when flight testing
moved into speeds between Mach 2.4 & 2.8. The aircraft experienced such
severe roughness so as to make its operation virtually out of the question.
The trouble was diagnosed as being in the air inlet system, which its controls
admitted air to the engine. At the higher speeds the flow of air was uneven and
the engine therefore could not function properly. Only after a long period of
experimentation, often highly frustrating and irritating was a solution reached.
This further got postponed when the A-12 could be declared operationally ready.
(U) Among more mundane troubles was the discovery that various nuts, bolts,
clamps, and other debris of the manufacturing process had not been cleared **
away, and upon engine run up or even take-off were sucked into the engine.
The engine parts were machined to such close tolerances that they could be
ruined in this fashion. Obviously the fault was due to sheer carelessness.
Inspection procedures were revised and it was also found prudent at Burbank
to hoist the engine nacelles into the air, rock them back and forth, listen for
loose objects, and then remove them by hand.
(** This footnote did NOT appear in the original document. It is the method I
will use to indicate marginal notes that were hand written, at the location of
in the original document. The marginal note states: hasn't changed)
(S) While on a routine flight, 24 May 1963, one of the detachment pilots
recognized an erroneous and confusing air speed indication and decided to
eject from the aircraft, which crashed 14 miles south of Wendover, Utah. The
pilot Kenneth Collins, was unhurt. The wreckage was recovered in two days
and persons at the scene were identified and requested to sign secrecy
agreements. A cover story for the press described the accident as an F-105
and is still listed in this way on official USAF accident records.
(U) All A-12 aircraft were grounded for a week during investigation of the
accident. A plugged pitot static tube in icing conditions turned out to be
responsible for the faulty cockpit instrument indications. It was not something
would hold things up for long. (S) The loss of this aircraft nevertheless
precipitated a policy problem which had been troubling the Agency for some
time. With the growing number of A-12's, how much longer could the project
remain secret? The program had gone through development, construction and
a year of flight testing by now without attracting public attention. But then
the Department of Defense was having difficulty in concealing its participation
because of the increasing rate of expenditures, otherwise unexplained. There
was a realization that the technological data would be extremely valuable in
connection with feasibility studies for the SST. Finally, there was a growing
awareness in the higher reaches of the aircraft industry that something new
and remarkable was going on. Rumors spread, and gossip flew about.
Commercial airline crews sighted the OXCART in flight. The editor of Aviation
Week (as might be expected) indicated his knowledge of developments at
Burbank airport seemed 'very hush-hush.' The secrecy was thinning out.
(S) The PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE FLOCK
Family Blackbird Gathering
(U) In spite of all this, 1963 went by without any public revelation. President
Johnson was brought up to date on the project a week after taking office and
directed that a paper be prepared for an announcement in the spring of
1964. Then at President Johnson's press conference on 24 Feb '64, he read
a statement the first paragraph was as follows:
(U) "The United States has successfully developed an advanced experimental
jet aircraft, the A-12, which has been tested in sustained flight at more than
2,000 miles per hour & at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. The performance
of A-12's will far exceed that of any other aircraft in the world today. The
development of this aircraft has been made possible by major advances in
aircraft technology of great significance for both military and commercial
applications. Several A-12 aircraft are now being flight tested at Edwards AFB
in California. The existence of this program is being disclosed today to permit
orderly exploitation of this advanced technology in our military and commercial
program."
(U) The president went on to mention the "mastery of the metallurgy and
fabrication of titanium metal," gave credit to Lockheed and Pratt & Whitney,
remarked that appropriate members of the Senate and House had been kept
fully informed, and prescribed that the detailed performance the A-12 would
be kept strictly classified.
(S) The President's reference to the "A-12" was of course deliberate. "A-11"
had been the original design designation for the all-metal aircraft 1st proposed
by Lockheed; subsequently it became the design designation for the Air Force
YF-12A interceptor which differed from its parent mainly in that it carried a
second man for launching air to air missiles. To preserve the distinction between
the A-11 and the A-12 Security had briefed practically all witting personnel in
government and industry on the impending announcement. OXCART secrecy
continued in effect. Considerable speculation about the Agency role in the
development was told, but it was never acknowledged by the government.
News headlines ranged from "US has dozen A-11 jets already flying" to
"Secret of sizzling new plane probably history's best kept."
(U) The President also said that "the A-11 aircraft now at Edwards Air Force
Base are undergoing extensive tests to determine their capabilities as long
range interceptors." It was true that the Air Force in October 1960, had
contracted for three interceptor versions of the A-12 & they were by this time
available. But at the moment when the President spoke, there were no A-11's
at Edwards & there never had been. Project officials had known that the public
announcement was about to be made, but they had not been told exactly when.
Caught by surprise, they hastily flew two Air Force YF-12A's to Edwards to
support the President's statement. So rushed was this operation, so speedily
were the aircraft put into hangars upon arrival, that heat activated the hangar
sprinkler system, dousing the guests which awaited the planes.
(S) Thenceforth, while the OXCART continued its secret career at its own site,
the A-11 performed at Edwards Air Force Base in a considerable glare of publicity.
Pictures of the aircraft appeared in the press, correspondents could look at it and
marvel, stories could be written. Virtually no details were made available, but the
technical journals nevertheless had a field day. The unclassified Air Force and
Space Digest, for example, published a long article in its issue of April 1964,
commencing: "The official pictures and statements tell very little about the A-11.
But the technical literature from open sources, when carefully interpreted, tells
a good deal about what it could and, more importantly, what it could not be.
Here's the story ...
(S) Going Operational
Aircraft Design By Kelly Johnson,
Engine Housing Design by Ben Rich
(U) Three years and seven months after first flight in April 1962 the Oxcart
was declared ready for operational use at design specifications. The period
thus devoted to flight tests was remarkably short, considering the new fields
of aircraft performance which were being explored. As each higher Mach
number was reached exhaustive tests were carried out in accordance with
standard procedures to ensure that the aircraft functioned properly and
safely. Defects were corrected and improvements made. All concerned
gained experience with the characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the vehicle.
(S) The air inlet and related control continued for a long time to present the
most troublesome and refractory problem. Numerous attempts failed to find a
remedy, even though a special task force concentrated on the task. For a time
there was something approaching despair, and the solution when finally
achieved was greeted with enormous relief. After all, not every experimental
aircraft of advanced performance has survived its flight testing period. The
possibility existed that OXCART also would fail, despite the great cost and
effort expended upon it. (S) A few dates and figures will serve to mark the
progress of events. By the end of 1963 there had been 573 flights totaling 765
hours. Nine aircraft were in the inventory. On 20 July 1963 test aircraft flew
for the first time at Mach 3; in November Mach 3.2 (the design speed) was
reached at 78,000 feet altitude. The longest sustained flight at design conditions
occurred on 3 February 1964; it lasted to ten minutes at Mach 3.2 and 83,000
feet. By the end of 1964 there had been 1,160 flights, totaling 1,616 hours.
Eleven aircraft were available, 4 for testing & 7 assigned to the detachment.
(C) The record may be put in another way. Mach 2 was reached after six months
of flying; Mach 3 after 15 months. Two years after the first flight the aircraft had
flown a total of 38 hours at Mach 2, three hours at Mach 2.6, and less than one
hour at Mach 3. After three years, Mach 2 time had increased to 60 hours, Mach
2.6 time time to 33 hours, and Mach 3 time to nine hours; all Mach 3 time,
however, was by test aircraft, and detachment aircraft were still restricted to
Mach 2.9.
(S) As may be seen from the figures, most flights were of short duration,
averaging little more than an hour each. Primarily this was because longer
flights were unnecessary at this stage of testing. It was also true, however,
that the less seen of OXCART the better and short flights helped to preserve
the secrecy of the proceedings. Yet it was virtually impossible for an aircraft
of such dimensions and capabilities to remain inconspicuous.
At its full speed OXCART had a turning radius of no less than 86 miles.
There was no question of staying close to the airfield; its shortest possible
flights took it over a very large expanse of territory.
(S) The first long-range, high-speed flight occurred on 27 January 1965,
when one of the test aircraft flew for an hour and forty minutes, with an hour
and fifteen minutes above Mach 3.1. Its total range was 2,580 nautical miles,
with altitudes between 75,600 and 80,000 feet. (U) Two more aircraft were
lost during this phase of the program. On 9 July 1964 Aircraft No. 133 was
making its final approach to the runway, at altitude of 500 feet & airspeed of
200 knots it began a smooth steady roll to the left. Lockheed test pilot Bill
Park could not overcome the roll. At about a 45 degree bank angle and 200
foot altitude he ejected. As he swung down to the vertical in the parachute
his feet touched the ground, for what must have been one of the narrower
escapes in the perilous history of test piloting. The primary cause of the
accident was that the servo for the right outboard roll & pitch control froze.
No news of the accident filtered out.
(S) On 28 December 1965 Aircraft No.126 crashed immediately after take
off and was totally destroyed. Detachment pilot Mele Vojvodich ejected safely
at an altitude of 150 feet. The accident investigation board determined that a
flight line electrician had improperly connected the yaw and pitch gyros had
in effect reversed the controls. This time Mr. McCone directed the Office of
Security to conduct an investigation into the possibility of sabotage. While
nothing of the sort was discovered, there were indications of negligence, as
the manufacturer of the gyro had earlier warned of the possibility that the
mechanism could be connected in reverse. No action had been taken, however,
even by such an elementary precaution as painting the contacts different colors.
Again there was no publicity connected with the accident.
(S) The year 1965 saw the test site reach the high point of activity. Completion
of construction brought it to full physical size. All detachment pilots were Mach
3.0 qualified. Site population reached 1,835. Contractors were working three
shifts a day. Private Lockheed Constellations made daily flights between the
factory at Burbank and the site. Two C-47 flights a day were made between the
site and Las Vegas. And officials were considering how and when and where to
use OXCART in its appointed role.
(S) Targeting the OX
(S) After the unhappy end of U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, US political
authorities were understandably cautious about committing themselves to
further manned reconnaissance over unfriendly territory. There was no
serious intention to use the OXCART over Russia; save in some
unforeseeable emergency it was indeed no longer necessary to do so.
What then, should be done with this vehicle?
(S) The first interest was in Cuba. By early 1964 Project Headquarters
began planning for the contingency of flights over Cuba under a program
designated SKYLARK. Bill Park's accident in early July held this program
up for a time, but on 5 August Acting DCI Marshall Carter directed that
SKYLARK achieve emergency operational readiness by 5 November. This
involved preparing a small detachment which should be able to do the job
over Cuba, though at something less than full design capability of the
OXCART. The goal was to operate at Mach 2.8 and 80,000'
(C) In order to meet the deadline set by General Carter, camera performance
would have to be validated, pilots qualified for Mach 2.8 flight & co-ordination
with supporting elements arranged.
(TS) The special cameras were a quiet revolution break through thanks to the
R&D department of Polaroid and its adjoining facility on the campus of MIT.
These units would remain classified for the longest time, in fact some parts
are classified to this day, over 40 years later. Only one of several for
electronic countermeasures (ECM) would be ready by November and a
senior intra-governmental group, including some representation from the
President's Scientific Advisory Committee, examined the problem of operating
over Cuba without the full complement of defensive systems.
This panel decided that the first few over flights could safely be conducted
without them, but the ECM would be necessary thereafter. The delivery
schedule of ECM equipment was compatible with this course of action.
(S) After considerable modifications to aircraft, the detachment simulated
Cuban missions on training flights, and a limited emergency SKYLARK
capability was announced on the date General Carter had set. With 2 weeks
notice the OXCART detachment could accomplish a Cuban over flight, even
though with fewer ready aircraft and pilots than had been planned.
(S) During the following weeks the detachment concentrated on developing
SKYLARK into a sustained capability, with five ready pilots & five operational
aircraft. The main tasks were to determine aircraft range and fuel consumption,
attain repeatable reliable operation, finish pilot training, prepare a family of
SKYLARK missions, and coordinate routes with North American Air Defense,
Continental Air Defense, and the Federal Aviation Authority. All this was
accomplished without substantially hindering the main task of working up
OXCART to full design capability. We may anticipate the story, however, by
remarking that despite all this preparation the OXCART was never used over
Cuba. U-2's proved adequate. A-12 was for more critical situations.
(S) In 1965 a more critical situation did indeed emerge in Asia, and interest in
using the aircraft there began to be manifest. On 18 March 1965 Mr. McCone
discussed with Secretaries McNamara and Vance the increasing hazards to
U-2 and drone reconnaissance of Communist China. A memorandum of this
conversation stated:
(S) "It was further agreed that we should proceed immediately with all
preparatory steps necessary to operate the OXCART over Communist China
and have them flying out of Okinawa at Kadena Air Base. It was agreed that
we should proceed with all construction & related arrangements. However,
this decision did not authorize the deployment of the OXCART to Okinawa
nor the decision to fly the OXCART over Communist China. The next
scheduled rotation decision would authorize all preparatory steps and the
expenditure of such funds as might be involved. No decision has been taken
to fly the OXCART operationally over Communist China. This decision can
only be made by the President." (S) Four days later Brigadier General Jack C.
Ledford, Director of the Office of Special Activities, DD/S&T, briefed Mr. Vance
on the scheme which had been drawn up for operations in the Far East.
(TS) The project was called BLACK SHIELD and it called for the OXCART to
operate out of the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa. In the first phase, 3
aircraft would stage to Okinawa for 60-day periods, twice a year, with about
225 personnel involved.
(S) After this was in good order, BLACK SHIELD would advance to the point
of maintaining a permanent detachment at Kadena. Secretary Vance made
$3.7 million available to be spent in providing support facilities on the island,
which were to be available by early fall of 1965.
(S) Meanwhile the Communists began to deploy surface-to-air missiles around
Hanoi, thereby threatening our current military reconnaissance capabilities.
Then Secretary McNamara called this to the attention of the Under Secretary
of the Air Force on 3 June 1965 & inquired about the practicability of substituting
OXCART aircraft for U-2's. He was told that BLACK SHIELD could operate over
Vietnam as soon as there was adequate aircraft and the expected performance
was achieved.
(S) With deployment overseas thus apparently impending in the fall, the
detachment went into the final stages of its program for validating the reliability
of aircraft and aircraft systems. It set out to demonstrate systems reliability at
Mach 3.05 and at 2,300 nautical miles range, with penetration altitude 76,000'.
A capability for three aerial refuelings was also part of the validation process.
(S) By this time the OXCART was well along in performance. The inlet, camera,
hydraulic, navigation and flight control systems all demonstrated acceptable
reliability. Nevertheless, as longer flights were conducted at high speeds and
high temperatures, new problems came to the surface, the most serious being
with the electrical wiring system. Wiring connectors and components had to
withstand temperatures of more than 800 degrees Fahrenheit, together with
structural flexing, vibration, and shock. Continuing malfunctions in the inlet
controls, communications equipment, ECM systems, and cockpit instruments
were in many cases attributable to wiring failures. There was also disturbing
evidence that careless handling contributed to electrical connector failures.
Difficulties persisted in the sealing of fuel tanks. What with one thing and
another, officials soon began to fear that the scheduled date for Black Shield
readiness would not be met. Prompt corrective action on the part of Lockheed
was in order. The quality of maintenance needed drastic improvement.
The responsibility for delivering an aircraft system with acceptable reliability
to meet an operational commitment lay in Lockheed's hands.
(S) In this uncomfortable situation, John Paragosky, Deputy for Technology,
OSA, went to the Lockheed plant to see Kelly Johnson on 3 Aug 1965. A frank
discussion ensued on the measures necessary to insure that BLACK SHIELD
commitments would be met, and Johnson concluded that he should himself
spend full time at the site in order to get the job done expeditiously. Lockheed
President Dan Haughton offered the full support of the corporation & Johnson
began duty the next day. Effective management got Project BLACK SHIELD
back on schedule.-
Habu pilots would wear... Astronaut Wings
(S) Four primary Black Shield aircraft were selected & final validation flights
conducted. During these tests the OXCART achieved a maximum speed of
Mach 3.29, altitude of 90,000 feet & sustained flight time above Mach 3.2 of
one hour and fourteen minutes.
The maximum endurance flight lasted six hours and twenty minutes. The last
stage was reached on 20 November 1965, and two days later Kelly Johnson
wrote General Ledford:
(S) " ... Over all, my considered opinion is that the aircraft can be successfully
deployed for the BLACK SHIELD mission with what I would consider to be at
least as low a degree of risk as in the early U-2 deployment days. Actually,
considering our performance level of more than four times the U-2 speed and
three miles more operating altitude, it is probably much less risky than our 1st
U-2 deployment. I think the time has come when the bird should leave its nest."
(S) Ten days later 303 Committee received a formal proposal that OXCART be
deployed to the Far East. The committee, after examining the matter, did not
approve. It did agree, that short of actually moving aircraft to Kadena AFB, all
steps should be taken to develop and maintain a quick reaction capability,
ready to deploy within a 21-day period at any time after 1 Jan 1966.
(S) There the matter remained, for more than a year. During 1966 there were
frequent renewals of the request to the 303 Committee for authorization to
deploy OXCART to Okinawa and conduct reconnaissance missions over
North Vietnam, Communist China, or both. All were turned down. Among high
officials there was difference of opinion; CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board favored the move, while
Alexis Johnson representing State and Defense in the persons of Messrs.
McNamara and Vance, opposed it. The proponents urged the necessity of
better intelligence, especially on a possible Chinese Communist build-up
preparatory to intervention in Vietnam. The opponents felt that better
intelligence was not so urgently needed as to justify the political risks of
basing the aircraft in Okinawa and thus almost certainly disclosing to
Japanese and other propagandists. They also really believed it was very
undesirable to use OXCART and wind up revealing something of its secret
capability until a more pressing requirement appeared. At least once, on
12 August 1966, the divergent views were brought up to the President, who
confirmed 303 Committee's majority opinion against deployment.
(S) Meanwhile, of course, flight testing and crew proficiency training continued.
There was plenty of time to improve mission plans and flight tactics, as well as
to prepare the forward area at Kadena. New plans shortened deployment time
from the 21 days first specified. Personnel and cargo were to be airlifted to
Kadena AB the day deployment was approved. On the 5th day the first OXCART
would depart and travel the 6,673 miles in five hours & 34 minutes. The second
would go on the seventh and the third on the 9th day. The first two would be
ready for an emergency mission on the eleventh day, and for a normal mission
on the fifteenth day. (S) An impressive demonstration of the Oxcart's capability
occurred on 21 December 1966 when Lockheed test pilot Bill Park flew 10,198
statute miles in six hours. The aircraft left the test area in Nevada & flew north
ward over Yellowstone National Park, then eastward to Bismarck, North Dakota
and on to Duluth, Minnesota. It then turned south and passed Atlanta en route
to Tampa, Florida, northwest to Portland, Oregon, then southwest to Nevada.
The flight turned eastward, passing Denver & Omaha. Turning around at St.
Louis and on over to Knoxville, Tennessee, it then passed Memphis in the home
stretch back to Nevada.
This flight established a record unapproachable by any other aircraft; it began
at the same time a typical government employee starts his work day and ended
two hours before his quitting time.
* (S) Shortly after this exploit, tragedy befell the program. During a routine
training flight on 5 January 1967, the fourth aircraft was lost, together with its
pilot. The accident occurred during descent about 70 miles from the base. A
fuel gauge failed to function properly, and the aircraft ran out of fuel only
minutes before landing. The pilot, Walter Ray, ejected but was killed when he
failed to separate from the ejection seat before impact. The aircraft was
totally destroyed. Its wreckage was found on 6 January and Ray's body
recovered a day later. Through Air Force channels a story was released to the
effect that an AF SR-71, on a routine test flight out of Edwards AFB, was
missing and presumed down in Nevada. The pilot was identified as a civilian
test pilot and newspapers connected him with Lockheed. Flight activity at&
-
SR71/A12 |
LOCKHEED | CONVAIR |
| Speed | Mach4.2 | Mach4.0 |
|
Range |
4,120nm |
4,000nm |
| LowAltitude | 84,000' | 84,000' |
| MedAltitude | 86,000' | 88.000' |
| HighAltitude | 97,000' | 94,000' |
| Length | 102' | 79' |
| Span | 57' | 56' |
| Gross Weight |
100,000lbs |
101,700lbs |
| Fuel Fuel |
64,000lbs |
62,000lbs |
| FirstFlight | 22months | 22months |