In The Beginning... SR-71
Stealth BLACKBIRD!

"The Seeker of Truth, That Is Without Peer or Equal"
This is what the Habu's, the Air Force pilots of the SR-71,
     said of their purpose and what their mission was all about.     

Before I go any further here, I know I am treading on some strong  
feelings & convictions. Let me say this up front.  Yes, I believe in  
the Almighty & I further believe with all my heart & soul that the  
heavens are teaming with life and that at least 99% of that life is   
much further along and advance of our own.
      Having said that, I also believe through personal knowledge and         
   access to a lot of classified records, that we on earth have never     
in its known existence been visited by ANY intelligent life and    
furthermore there does not exist in any known location so much  
  as one shred of evidence to the contrary.  I sincerely wish I could 
 have better news to report here, but that would not be truthful to 
you or to me.  

       Further to the above...
YES, this does include Roswell 47, Eglin, Wright-Pat, Groom Lake.
Majestic and    
   

•       A-12 OXCART  
                       and the UFO Conspiracy Theory
  November 1954, CIA had entered into the world of high technology with 
  its U-2 overhead reconnaissance project. Working with Lockheed's Advanced 
  Development facility in Burbank, California, known as the Skunk Works, and
  Kelly Johnson, an experimental aircraft: the U-2. It could fly at 60,000 feet; 
  in the mid-1950's, most commercial airliners flew between 10,000 feet and 
  20,000 feet. Consequently, once the U-2 started test flights, pilots and air 
  traffic controllers began reporting a large increase in UFO sightings. The early 
  U-2s were silver (they were later painted black) and reflected the rays from 
  the sun, especially at sunrise & sunset. They often appeared as fiery objects 
  to observers below. Air Force BLUE BOOK investigators aware of the secret 
  U-2 flights tried to explain away such sightings by linking them to natural 
  phenomena such as ice crystals and temperature inversions. By checking with
  the Agency's U-2 Project Staff in Washington, BLUE BOOK investigators were 
  able to attribute many UFO sightings to U-2 flights. They were careful, however,
  not to reveal the true cause of the sighting to the public. According to later 
  estimates from CIA officials who worked on the U-2 project and the OXCART
  (SR-71, or Blackbird) project, over half of all UFO reports from the late 1950s 
  through the 1960s were accounted for by manned reconnaissance flights 
  (namely the U-2) over the United States. This led the Air Force to make 
  misleading and deceptive statements to the public in order to allay public 
  fears and to protect an extraordinarily sensitive national security assets.
   
  While perhaps justified, this deception added fuel to the later conspiracy 
  theories and the cover-up controversy of the 1970s. The percentage of what 
  the Air Force considered unexplained UFO sightings fell to 5.9  release of the 
  Robertson panel report on UFOs. In 1956, Edward Ruppelt, former head of 
  the Air Force BLUE BOOK project, publicly revealed the existence of the 
  panel. A best-selling book by UFOlogist Donald Keyhoe, a retired Marine Corps 
  major, advocated release of all government information relating to UFOs. 
  Civilian UFO groups such as the National Investigations Committee on Aerial 
  Phenomena (NICAP) and the Aerial Phenomena Research Organization (APRO) 
  immediately pushed for release of the Robertson panel report. Under pressure, 
  the Air Force approached CIA for permission to declassify and release the 
  report. Despite such pressure, Philip Strong, Deputy Assistant Director of OSI, 
  refused to declassify the report & declined to disclose CIA sponsorship of the 
  panel. As an alternative, the Agency prepared a sanitized version of the report 
  potential in the UFO controversy. The demands, however, for more government 
  information about UFOs did not let up. On 8 March 1958, Keyhoe, in an interview
  with Mr. Mike Wallace of CBS, claimed deep CIA involvement with UFOs & CIA
  sponsorship of the Robertson panel. This prompted letters to the Agency from 
  Keyhoe and Dr. Leon Davidson, a chemical engineer and UFOlogist. They 
  demanded the release of the full Robertson panel report & confirmation of CIA 
  involvement in the UFO issue. Davidson had convinced himself that the Agency, 
  not the Air Force, carried most of the responsibility for UFO analysis and that 
  "the activities of the US Government are responsible for the flying saucer 
  sightings of the last decade." Indeed, because of the undisclosed U-2 and 
  OXCART flights, Davidson was closer to the truth than he suspected. CIA,
  nevertheless held firm to its policy of not revealing its role in UFO investigations 
  and refused to declassify the full Robertson panel report. In a meeting with Air 
  Force representatives to discuss how to handle future inquires such as Keyhoe's 
  and Davidson's, Agency officials confirmed their opposition to the declassification 
  of the full report and worried that Keyhoe had the ear of former DCI VAdm. 
  Roscoe Hillenkoetter, who served on the board of governors of NICAP. They 
  debated whether to have CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston show 
  Hillenkoetter the report as a possible way to defuse the situation. CIA officer 
  Frank Chapin also hinted that Davidson might have ulterior motives, "some of 
  them perhaps not in the best interest of this country,"  and suggested bringing 
  in the FBI to investigate. Although the record is unclear whether the FBI ever 
  instituted an investigation of Davidson or Keyhoe, or even whether Houston ever 
  saw Hillenkoetter about the Robertson report, but in the end Hillenkoetter did 
  resign from the NICAP in 1962. 
  
  
  
  The Agency was also involved with Davidson and Keyhoe in two rather famous 
  UFO cases in the 1950s, which helped contribute to a growing sense of public 
  distrust of CIA with regard to UFOs. One focused on what was reported to have 
  been a tape recording of a radio signal from a flying saucer; the other on 
  reported photos of a flying saucer. The "radio code" incident began innocently
  enough in 1955, when two elderly sisters in Chicago, Mildred & Marie Maier,
  reported in the Journal of Space Flight their experiences with UFOs, including 
  the recording of a radio program in which an unidentified code was reportedly
  heard. The sisters taped the program and other ham radio operators also claimed
  to have heard the "space message." OSI became interested and asked the
  Scientific Contact Branch to obtain a copy of the recording. Field officers from the
  Contact Division (CD), one of whom was Dewelt Walker, made contact with the
  Maier sisters, who were "thrilled that the government was interested," and set up
  a time to meet with them.   In trying to secure the tape recording, 
  the Agency officers reported that they had stumbled upon a scene from Arsenic
  and Old Lace. "The only thing lacking was the elderberry wine," Walker cabled
  Headquarters. After reviewing the sisters' scrapbook of clippings from their days
  on the stage, the officers secured a copy of the recording. OSI analyzed the tape
  and found it was nothing more than Morse code from a US radio station. The matter
  rested until UFO-ologist Leon Davidson talked with the Maier sisters in 1957. The
  sisters remembered they had talked with a Mr. Walker who said he was from the
  US Air Force. Davidson then wrote to a Mr. Walker, believing him to be a US Air
  Force Intelligence Officer from OSI at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio and to ask if the
  tape had been analyzed at ATIC.  Dewelt Walker replied to Davidson that the tape
  had been forwarded to proper authorities for evaluation, and no information was
  available concerning the results. Not satisfied, and suspecting that Walker was
  really a CIA officer, Davidson next wrote DCI Allen Dulles demanding to learn what
  the coded message revealed and who Mr. Walker was.
  The Agency, wanting to keep Walker's identity as a CIA agent a secret, replied that
  another agency of the government had analyzed the tape in question and that
  Davidson would be hearing from the Air Force. On 5th August, the Air Force wrote
  Davidson saying that Walker "was and is an Air Force Officer" and that the tape
  "was analyzed by another government organization." 
  The Air Force letter confirmed  the recording contained only identifiable Morse 
  code which came from a known US-licensed radio station. Davidson wrote Dulles 
  again. This time he wanted to know the identity of the Morse operator and of the 
  agency that had conducted the analysis. CIA and the Air Force were now in a 
  quandary. The Agency had previously denied that it had actually analyzed the tape. 
  The Air Force had also denied analyzing the tape and claimed that Walker 
  was an Air Force officer. CIA officers, under cover, contacted Davidson in 
  Chicago and promised to get the code translation and the identification of 
  the transmitter, if possible. In another attempt to pacify Davidson, a CIA 
  officer, again under cover and wearing his Air Force uniform, contacted 
  Davidson in New York City. The CIA officer explained that there was no 
  super agency involved and that Air Force policy was not to disclose who was 
  doing what. Seeming to accept this argument, Davidson nevertheless pressed 
  for disclosure of the recording message and the source. The officer agreed to
  see what he could do. After checking Headquarters, the CIA officer phoned
  Davidson to report that a thorough check had been made and, because the 
  signal was of known US origin, the tape and the notes made at the time had 
  been destroyed to conserve file space. Incensed over what he then perceived 
  was a runaround, Davidson told the CIA officer that "he & his agency, 
  whichever, were acting like Jimmy Hoffa and the Teamster Union in destroying 
  records which might indict them." Believing that any contact with Davidson 
  would only encourage more speculation, the Contact Division washed its hands 
  of the issue by reporting to the DCI and to ATIC that it would not respond to or 
  try to contact Davidson again. Thus, a minor, rather bizarre incident, handled 
  poorly by both CIA and the Air Force, turned into a major flap that added fuel 
  to the growing mystery surrounding UFOs and CIA's role in their investigation.  
  Another flap a few months later added to the growing questions surrounding 
  the Agency's true role with regard to flying saucers. CIA's concern over secrecy 
  again made matters worse. In 1958, Major Keyhoe charged that the Agency was 
  deliberately asking eyewitnesses of UFOs not to make their sightings public. The 
  incident stemmed from a November 1957 request from OSI to the CD to obtain 
  from Ralph C. Mayher, a photographer for KYW-TV in Philadelphia, certain 
  photographs he took in 1952 of an unidentified flying object. Harry Real, a CD 
  officer, contacted Mayher and obtained copies of the photographs for analysis. 
  On 12 December 1957, John Hazen, another CD officer, returned the five photos 
  of the alleged UFO to Mayher without comment. Mayher asked Hazen for the 
  Agency's evaluation of the photos, explaining that he was trying to organize a 
  TV program to brief the public on UFOs. He wanted to mention on the show that 
  a US intelligence organization had viewed the photographs and thought them of 
  interest. Although he advised Mayher not to take this approach, Hazen stated 
  that Mayher was a US citizen and would have to make his own decision as to 
  what to do.  Keyhoe later contacted Mayher, who told him his story of CIA and 
  the photographs. Keyhoe then asked the Agency to confirm Hazen's employment 
  in writing, in an effort to expose CIA's role in UFO investigations. The Agency 
  refused, despite the fact that CD field representatives were normally overt and 
  carried credentials identifying their Agency association. DCI Dulles's aide, John 
  Earman, merely sent Keyhoe a noncommittal letter noting that, because UFOs 
  were of primary concern to the Department of the Air Force, the Agency had
  referred his letter to the Air Force for an appropriate response. Like the response
  to Davidson, the Agency reply to Keyhoe only fueled the speculation that the
  Agency was deeply involved in UFO sightings. Pressure to release information
  on UFOs continued to grow. Although CIA had a declining interest in UFO cases,
  it continued to monitor UFO sightings. Officials felt the need to keep informed on
  UFOs if only to alert the DCI to the more sensational UFO reports and flaps. 

•   Genesis of CIA
              & the OXCART Aircraft
     KEY: (U)   Unclassified         
              (C)   Classified since declassified
                  (S)    Secret since declassified
                      (TS) Top Secret since declassified
                         all thanks to the Freedom Of Information Act.  
  
  In the beginning.... THE OXCART STORY
                               compiled by Thomas P. McIninch (CIA)                                                         
  (S) One spring day in 1962 a test pilot named Louis Schalk, employed by 
  the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, took off from the Nevada desert in an 
  aircraft the likes of which had never been seen before. A casual observer 
  would have been startled by the appearance of this vehicle; he would 
  perhaps have noticed especially its extremely long, slim, shape, its two 
  enormous jet engines, its long sharp, projecting nose, and its swept-back 
  wings which appeared far too short to support the fuselage in flight. He 
  might well have realized that this was a revolutionary airplane; he could 
  not have known that it would be able to fly at three times the speed of 
  sound for more than 3,000 miles without refueling, or that toward the end 
  of its flight, when fuel began to run low, it could cruise at over 90,000 feet. 
  Still less would he have known of the equipment it was to carry, or of the
  formidable problems attending its design and construction. 
  (U) There was, of course, no casual observer present. The aircraft had been 
  designed and built for reconnaissance; it was projected as a successor to the 
  U-2. Its development had been carried out in profound secrecy. Despite the 
  numerous designers, engineers, skilled and unskilled workers, administrators 
  and others who had been involved in the affair, no authentic accounts, and 
  indeed scarcely any accounts at all, had leaked. Many aspects have not been 
  revealed to this day, and many are likely to remain classified for some time. 
  (S) The official designation of the aircraft was A-12. By a sort of inspired 
  perversity, however, it came to be called OXCART, a code word also applied 
  to the program under which it was developed. The secrecy in which it was so 
  long shrouded has lifted a bit and the purpose of this article is to give some 
  account of the inception, development, operation, and untimely demise of this 
  remarkable airplane. The OXCART no longer flies, but it has left a legacy of 
  technological achievement which points the way to new projects. It became 
  the progenitor of a similar but somewhat less sophisticated reconnaissance 
  vehicle called the SR-71 by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and whose 
  existence is well known to press and public. 
                                  Sequel to the U-2
  (S) The U-2 dated from 1954 & its development began under the direction 
  of a group headed by Richard M. Bissell of CIA. In June 1956, the aircraft 
  became operational, but officials predicted that its useful lifetime over the 
  USSR could hardly be much more than 18 months or two years. Its first 
  flight over Soviet territory revealed that the defense warning system not 
  only detected but tracked it quite accurately. 
  Yet, it remained a unique and (S) invaluable source of intelligence information 
  for almost four years, until on 1 May 1960, Francis Gary Powers was shot 
  down near  Sverdlovsk.  (U) Meanwhile, even as the U-2 commenced its active 
  career, efforts were under way to make it less vulnerable. The hope was to 
  reduce the vehicle's radar cross-section, so that it became less susceptible 
  to detection. New developments in radar-absorbing materials were tried and 
  achieved considerable success, though not enough to solve the problem.  
  Various far-out designs were explored, most of them seeking to create an 
  aircraft capable of flying at extremely high altitudes, though still at relatively 
  slow speed. However, none of them proved practicable. (S) Eventually, in the 
  fall of 1957, Bissell arranged with a contractor for a job of operations analysis 
  to determine how far the probability of shooting down an airplane varied 
  respectively with the plane's speed, altitude, and radar cross section. This 
  analysis demonstrated that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of 
  detection by radar. The probability of being shot down was not of course 
  reduced to zero, but it was evident that the supersonic line of approach was 
  worth serious consideration. Then from this time on, attention focused 
  increasingly on the possibility of building a vehicle which could fly at extremely 
  high speeds as well as great altitudes, and which would also incorporate the 
  best that could be attained in radar absorbing capabilities. Lockheed Aircraft 
  Corporation and Convair Division of General Dynamics were both informed of 
  the general requirements, and their designers set out to work on the problem 
  without as yet receiving any contract or funds from the government. 
  
  The fall of 1957 to late 1958 these designers constantly refined and adapted 
  their respective schemes. (S) Bissell realized that development and production 
  of such an aircraft would be exceedingly expensive, and that in the early stages 
  at least it would be doubtful whether the project could succeed. But, to secure 
  the necessary funds for such a program, high officials would have to receive the 
  best and most authoritative presentation of whatever prospects might unfold. 
  Accordingly, he got together a panel consisting of two distinguished authorities 
  on aero-dynamics and one physicist, with none other than the Russian Jewish 
  immigrant Dr. Edwin M. Land of the Polaroid Corporation as chairman. This was 
  a strange irony as one of the reasons besides religious persecution was the 
  common European thinking at the time was Jews could not be trusted for military 
  service or did not have anything to contribute. Nobel, Einstein and Rickover 
  seems to have change that.  Between 1957 and 1959 this panel met about six 
  times, usually in Land's office in Cambridge, which was located on the grounds 
  of MIT. The Lockheed and Convair designers attended many parts of the 
  sessions.  So did the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy concerned 
  with research and development, together with one or two of their technical 
  advisors. One useful consequence of the participation of service representatives 
  was that bureaucratic and jurisdictional feuds were reduced virtually to nil. 
  Throughout the program both Air Force and Navy gave valuable assistance and 
  cooperation. (S) As the months went by, the general outlines of what might be 
  done took shape in the minds of those concerned. Late in November 1958, the 
  members of the panel held a crucial meeting. They agreed that it now appeared 
  feasible to build an aircraft of such speed and altitude as to be very difficult to 
  track by radar. They recommended that the president be asked to approve in 
  principle a further prosecution of the project, to make funds available for 
  further studies and tests. The president and his Scientific Advisor, Dr. James 
  Killian were already aware of what was happening and when CIA officials went to 
  them with the recommendations of the panel they received a favorable hearing. 
  President Eisenhower gave his approval. Lockheed and Convair were then asked 
  to submit definite proposals, funds were made available to them, and the project 
  took on the code name GUSTO. 
  
  (C) Less than a year later the two proposals were essentially complete, and on 
  the 20 July 1959, the President was again briefed. This time he gave final 
  approval, which signified that the program could get fully under way. (C) The 
  next major step was to choose between the Lockheed and Convair designs. On 
  20 August 1959 specifications of the two proposals were submitted to a joint 
  DOD / USAF / CIA selection panel:
                                                   

SR71/A12	LOCKHEED	CONVAIR
Speed	Mach4.2	Mach4.0
Range	4,120nm	4,000nm
LowAltitude	84,000'	84,000'
MedAltitude	86,000'	88.000'
HighAltitude	97,000'	94,000'
Length	102'	79'
Span	57'	56'
Gross Weight	100,000lbs	101,700lbs
Fuel Fuel	64,000lbs	62,000lbs
FirstFlight	22months	22months

• 
  
  And The Winner...
  
  
  
  (S) The Lockheed design was selected, Project GUSTO terminated, and the 
  program to develop a new U-2 follow-on aircraft was names OXCART. On 3 
  September 1959, CIA authorized Lockheed to proceed with antiradar studies, 
  aerodynamic structural tests, and engineering designs. On 30 January 1960 
  gave the green light to produce the first 12 aircraft.
                          Hence First Dozen Craft = A-12 designation!
  (S) Pratt/Whitney Division of United Aircraft Corporation had been involved 
  in discussions of the project, and undertook to develop the propulsion system. 
  Their J-58 engine, which was to be used in the A-12, had been sponsored 
  originally by the US Navy for its own purposes, and was to be capable of a 
  speed of Mach 3.0. Navy interest in the development was diminishing, however, 
  and the Secretary of Defense had decided to withdraw from the program at the 
  end of 1959. CIA's requirement was that the engine and aircraft be further 
  developed and optimized for a speed of Mach 3.2. The new contract called for 
  initial assembly of three advanced experimental engines for both durability and 
  reliability testing, and provision of three engines for experimental flight testing 
  in early 1961. (S) Primary camera manufacturer was Perkin-Elmer. Because of 
  the extreme complexity of the design, however, a decision was soon made that 
  a back-up system might be necessary in the event the Perkin-Elmer design ran 
  into production problems & Eastman Kodak was also asked to build a camera 
  which was personally recommended by Edwin Land!  Minneapolis-Honeywell 
  Corporation was selected to provide both the inertial navigation and automatic 
  flight control system. The Firewell Corp. & the David Clark Corporation were 
  the prime sources of pilot equipment and associated life support hardware. 
  
  (U) Lockheed's chief designer was Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson, creator of the 
  U-2 and he called his new vehicle not A-12 but A-11. Its design exhibited many 
  innovations. Supersonic airplanes, however, involve a multitude of extremely 
  difficult design problems. Their payload-range performance is highly sensitive
  to engine weight, structural weight, fuel consumption, and aero dynamic efficiency. 
  Small mistakes in predicting these values; lead to large errors in performance. 
  Models of the A-11 were then tested and retested, adjusted & readjusted, 
  during thousands of hours in the wind tunnel. Johnson was confident of his 
  design, but no one could say positively whether the bird would fly, still less 
  whether it fulfilled the extremely demanding requirements laid down for it. (U)   
  To make the drawings & test the model was one thing; to build the aircraft was 
  another.  The most numerous problems arose from the simple fact that in 
  flying through the atmosphere at its designed speed the skin of the aircraft 
  would be subjected to a temperature of more than 550 degrees Fahrenheit. 
  For one thing, no metal hitherto commonly used in aircraft production could 
  with stand this temperature, and those which would do so were for the most 
  part too heavy to be suitable for the purpose in hand. (S) During the design 
  phase Lockheed evaluated many materials & finally chose an alloy of titanium, 
  characterized by great strength, relatively light weight and good resistance to 
  high temperatures. Titanium was also scarce & very costly. Methods for milling 
  it & controlling the quality of the product were not fully developed. Of the early 
  deliveries from Titanium Metals Corporation some 80 % had to be rejected and 
  it was not until 1961, when a delegation from headquarters visited the officials 
  of that company, informed them of the objectives & high priority of the OXCART 
  program and gained their full cooperation, that the supply became consistently 
  satisfactory. (S) But this only solved an initial problem. One of the virtues of 
  titanium was its exceeding hardness, but this very virtue gave rise to immense 
  difficulties in machining and shaping the material. Even drills which worked well 
  on aluminum soon broke to pieces; new ones had to be devised. Assembly line 
  production was impossible; each of the small OXCART fleet was, so to speak, 
  turned out by hand. The cost of the program mounted well above original 
  estimates, and it soon began to run behind schedule. One after another, 
  however, the problems were solved, and their solution constituted perhaps the
  greatest single technological achievement of the entire enterprise. Henceforth
  it became practicable, if expensive, to build the aircraft out of titanium.
  (S) Since every additional pound of weight was critical, adequate insulation
  was out of the question. The inside of the aircraft would be like a moderately
  hot oven. The pilot would have to wear a kind of space suit, with its own cooling 
  apparatus, pressure control, oxygen supply & other necessities for survival. 
  
  The fuel tanks, which constituted by far the greater part of the aircraft, 
  would heat up to about 350 degrees, so that special fuel had to be supplied 
  and the tanks themselves rendered inert with nitrogen. Lubricating oil was 
  formulated for operation at 600 degrees F., and contained a diluent in order 
  to remain fluid at operation below 40 degrees. Insulation on the plane's 
  intricate wiring soon became brittle and useless.  During the lifetime of the 
  OXCART no better insulation was found; the wiring & related connectors had 
  to be given special attention at great cost in labor and in time.  
  
  
  (S) Then there was the unique problem of the camera window. The OXCART 
  was to carry a delicate and highly sophisticated camera as its main mission, 
  which would look out through a quartz glass window. The effectiveness of the 
  whole system depended upon achieving freedom from optical distortion 
  despite the great heat to which the window would be subjected. Thus the 
  question was not simply one of providing equipment with resistance to high 
  temperature, but assuring there should be no unevenness of temperature 
  throughout the area of the window. It took three years of time and 2 million 
  dollars of money to arrive a satisfactory solution. The program scored one of 
  its most remarkable successes when the quartz glass was successfully fused 
  to its metal frame by an unprecedented process involving the use of high 
  frequency sound waves. (S) Another major problem of different nature was 
  to achieve the low radar cross-section desired. The airframe areas giving the 
  greatest radar return were the vertical stabilizers, the engine inlet, and the 
  forward side of the engine nacelles. Research in ferrite's, high temperature 
  absorbing materials and high temperature plastic structures was undertaken 
  to find methods to reduce the return. Eventually the vertical tail section fins 
  were constructed from a kind of laminated type "plastic" material-the first 
  time that such a material had been used for an important part of an aircraft's 
  structure. Such changes in structural materials, the A-11 was re-designated 
  A-12, and as such has never been publicly disclosed. 
  (C) To test the effectiveness of antiradar devices a small-scale model is 
  inadequate; only a full-size mock-up will do. Lockheed accordingly built one 
  of these as early as November 1959, transported it in a specially designed 
  trailer truck over hundreds of miles of highway from the Burbank plant to 
  the test area.  Here it was hoisted to the top of a pylon and looked at from 
  various angles by radar. Tests and adjustments went on for a year before 
  the results were deemed satisfactory. In the course of the process it was 
  found desirable to attach some sizable metallic constructions on each side 
  of the fuselage and Kelly Johnson worried a good deal about the effect of 
  these protuberances on his design.    In flight tests, it later developed that 
  they imparted a useful aerodynamic lift to the vehicle, and years afterward
  Lockheed's design for a supersonic transport embodied similar structures.  
  
  
  (S) Pilots for the OXCART would obviously have to be quite extraordinary 
  competence, not only because of the unprecedented performance of the 
  aircraft itself, but also because of the particular qualities needed in men 
  who were to fly these intelligence type missions. Brigadier General Don
  Littman, of the Air Force, was designated to draw up the criteria for 
  selection, with advice from Kelly Johnson & even from CIA Headquarters. 
  Pilots had to be qualified in the latest high performance fighters, they had 
  to be emotionally stable, and well motivated. They were to be between 25 
  and 40 years of age, and the size of the A-12 cockpit prescribed that they 
  be under six feet tall and under 175 pounds in weight.  
  (S) Air Force files were screened for possible candidates and a list of pilots 
  obtained. Psychological assessments, physical examinations & refinement
  of criteria eliminated a good many. Pre-evaluation processing resulted in 16 
  potential nominees.  This group underwent a further intensive security and 
  medical scrutiny by the Agency. Those who remained were then approached 
  to take employment with the Agency on a highly classified project involving a 
  very advanced aircraft. In November 1961, commitments were obtained from 
  five of the group. The small number recruited at this stage required that a 
  second search be undertaken. (S) When the final screening was complete the 
  pilots selected from the program were William L. Skliar, Kenneth S. Collins, 
  Walter Ray, Lon Walter, Mele Vojvodich, Jack W. Weeks, Ron "Jack" Layton, 
  Dennis B. Sullivan, David P. Young, Francis  Murray, and Russell Scott. Right 
  after the selection, arrangements were made with the Air Force to effect 
  appropriate transfers and assignments to cover their training and to lay the 
  basis for their transition from military to civilian status. Compensation and 
  insurance arrangements were similar to those for the U-2 pilots. 
  
  (U) One thing to be decided in the earliest stages of the program was where 
  to base and test the aircraft. Lockheed clearly could not do the business at 
  Burbank, where the aircraft were being built, if for no other reason that its 
  runway was short.  The ideal location ought to be remote from metropolitan 
  areas; well away from civil and military airways to preclude observation; 
  easily accessible by air; blessed with good weather the year round; capable 
  of accommodating large numbers of personnel; equipped with fuel storage 
  facilities; fairly close to an Air Force installation; and possessing at least an 
  8,000 foot runway. There was no such place to be found.  
  (S) Ten Air Force bases programmed for closure were considered, but none 
  provided the necessary security and the annual operating costs at most of 
  them would be unacceptable. Edwards Air Force Base in California seemed 
  a more likely candidate, but in the end it also was passed over. Instead a 
  secluded site in Nevada was finally picked. It was deficient in personnel 
  accommodations and POL storage, its long unused runway was inadequate, 
  but security was good, or could be made so, and a moderate construction 
  program could provide sufficient facilities. Lockheed then estimated what 
  would be needed in such respects as monthly fuel consumption, hangars and 
  shop space, housing for personnel and runway specifications. Armed with 
  the list of major requirements, Headquarters came up with a construction 
  and engineering plan. And in case anyone became curious about what was 
  going on at this remote spot, a cover story stated that the facilities were 
  being prepared for certain radar studies, to be conducted by an engineering 
  firm with support from the Air Force. The remote location was explained as 
  necessary to reduce the effect of electronic interference by outside sources.
  
  (S) Excellent as it may have been from the point of view of security, the site 
  at first afforded few of the necessities and none of the amenities of life. It 
  was far from any metropolitan center.  Lockheed provided a non descript 
  C-47 as shuttle service to its home  plant at Burbank and a chartered D-18
  (Lodestar) furnished transportation to Las Vegas. Daily commuting was out 
  of the question, however & the construction workers arriving during 1960 
  were billeted in surplus trailers. New water wells were dug and a few 
  recreational facilities provided, but it was some time before any of the 
  accommodations became agreeable. ** 
  (** This footnote did NOT appear in the original document. It is the method I will use 
  to indicate marginal notes that were hand written, at the location of '**' in the original
  document. The marginal note states: (1955) (S) Among the lesser snags, one existed
  because the laws of Nevada required the names of all contractor personnel staying in 
  the state for more than 48 hours to be reported to state authorities. It was generally 
  felt that to list all these names and identify the companies involved would be likely to 
  give the whole show away. The Agency's General Counsel, however, discovered that 
  Government employees were exempted from these requirements. Thenceforth all 
  contractor personnel going to the site received appointments as paid Government
  consultants, and if questions were asked the reply could be that no one but official 
  government employees were at this site. 
  (C) Construction began in September 1960, and continued on a double 
  shift schedule until mid 1964. One of the most urgent tasks was to build 
  the runway, which according to initial estimates of A-12 requirements 
  must be 8,500 feet long. The existing asphalt runway was 5,000 feet 
  long and incapable of supporting the weight of the A-12. The new one 
  was built between 7 September and 15 November and involved pouring 
  over 25,000 yards of concrete. Another problem was to provide some 
  500,000 gallons of PF-1 aircraft fuel per month. Neither storage facilities 
  nor means of transporting fuel existed. After considering the use of airlift, 
  pipeline and truck transport, it was decided that the last named was the 
  most economical, and could be made feasible by resurfacing no more than 
  eighteen miles of highway leading into the base.  
  (C) Three surplus Navy hangars were obtained, dismantled, and erected 
  on the north side of the base. Over 100 surplus Navy housing buildings 
  were transported to the base and made ready for occupancy. By early 
  1962 a fuel tank farm was ready, with a capacity of 1,320,000 gallons. 
  Warehousing and shop space was begun and repairs made to older 
  buildings. All this, together with the many other facilities that had to be 
  provided, took a long time to complete. Meanwhile, however, the really 
  essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery date of 
  Aircraft #1 in Aug 1961.  
  (S) Facilities were ready, but the aircraft were not. Originally promised 
  for delivery at the end of May 1961, the date first slipped to August, 
  largely because of Lockheed's difficulties in procuring and fabricating 
  titanium. Then Pratt & Whitney found unexpectedly great trouble in 
  bringing the J-58 engine up to the OXCART requirements. 
  In March 1961, Kelly Johnson notified Headquarters: (U) "Schedules 
  are in jeopardy on two fronts. One is the assembly of the wing and the 
  other is in satisfactory development of the engine. Our evaluation shows 
  that each of these programs is from  (S) three to four months behind the 
  current schedule."  To this Bissell replied:  (U) "I have learned of your 
  expected additional delay in 1st flight from 30 August to 1 December 61. 
  This news is extremely shocking on top of our previous slippage from May 
  to August and my understanding as of our meeting 19 Dec '61 that the 
  titanium extrusion problems were essentially overcome. I trust this is the 
  last disappointment short of a severe Burbank earthquake."  
  
  (U) Realizing that delays were causing the cost of the program to soar, 
  Headquarters decided to place a top-level aeronautical engineer in
  residence at Lockheed to monitor the program & submit progress reports. 
  (C) Delays nevertheless persisted. On 11 September, Pratt and Whitney 
  informed Lockheed of their continuing difficulties with the J-58 engine in 
  terms of weight, delivery, and performance. Completion date for #1 
  aircraft by now had slipped to 22 December 1961, and the first flight to 
  27 February 1962. Even on this last date the J-58 would not be ready, it 
  was therefore decided that a Pratt and Whitney J-75 engine, designed for 
  the F-105 & flown in the U-2, should be used for early flights. The engine, 
  with other components, could be fitted to the A-12 airframe, and it could 
  power the aircraft safely to altitudes up to 50,000 feet & at speeds up to 
  Mach 1.6. (S) When this decision had been made, final preparations were 
  begun for the testing phase. In late 1961 Colonel Robert J. Holbury, USAF, 
  was named Commander of the base, with the Agency employee as his his 
  Deputy. Support aircraft began arriving in the spring of 1962. These did 
  include eight F-101's for training, two T-33's for proficiency flying, a C-130 
  for any cargo transport, a U-3A for administration purposes, a helicopter 
  for search and rescue and a Cessna- 180 for liaison use.  Additionally, 
  Lockheed provided an F-104 to act as chase aircraft during the A-12 flight 
  test period.  (S) Meanwhile in January 1962, an agreement was reached 
  with the Federal Aviation Agency that expanded all the restricted airspace 
  in the vicinity of the test area. Certain FAA air traffic controllers were 
  cleared for the OXCART Project; their function was to insure that aircraft 
  did not violate the order. The North American Air Defense Command 
  established procedures to prevent their radar stations from reporting the 
  appearance of high performance aircraft on their radar scopes. 
  
  (S) Refueling concepts required pre-positioning of vast quantities of fuel at 
  certain points outside the United States. 
  Special tank farms were programmed in California, Eielson AFB Alaska, 
  Thule AB Greenland, Kadena AB Okinawa, and Adana AB, Turkey. 
  Since the A-12 use specially refined fuel, these tank farms were reserved 
  exclusively for use by the OXCART Program. Very small detachments of 
  technicians at these locations maintained the fuel storage facility and 
  arranged for periodic quality control fuel tests. 
  
  (S) At the Lockheed Burbank plant, Aircraft No. 1 (serially numbered 121) 
  received its final tests and checkout during January and February 1962, 
  and was partially disassembled for shipment to the site. It became clear 
  very early in OXCART planning  that because of security problems and the 
  inadequate runway, the A-12 could not fly from Burbank. Movement of the 
  full-scale (S) radar test model was successfully accomplished in November 
  1959, as described above. A thorough survey of the route in June 1961, 
  ascertained the hazards and problems of moving  the actual aircraft and 
  showed that a package measuring 35 feet wide and 105 feet long could be 
  transported without major difficulty. Obstructing road signs were removed, 
  trees trimmed and some roadsides leveled. Appropriate arrangements were 
  made with police authorities and local officials to help accomplish the safe 
  transport of the aircraft. The entire fuselage, minus wings  was crated, 
  covered & loaded on the special trailer, which cost about  $100,000. 
  On 26 Feb 1962, it departed Burbank, and arrived at the base.
  
                              (S) First Flights          
  (U) Upon arrival reassembly of the aircraft and installation of the J-75 
  engines began. Soon it was found that aircraft tank sealing compounds 
  had failed to adhere to the metals, and when fuel was put into the tanks 
  numerous leaks occurred. It was then necessary to strip the tanks of the 
  faulty sealing compounds and reline them with new materials. 
  
  Thus occurred 1 more unexpected AND exasperating delay in the program. 
  (U) Finally, on 26 April 1962, Aircraft 121 was ready. On that day in 
  accordance with Kelly Johnson's custom, Louis Schalk took it for an 
  unofficial, unannounced, maiden flight lasting some 40 minutes. As in all 
  maiden flights minor problems were detected, but it took only four more 
  days to ready the aircraft for its first official flight. (U) On 30 April 1962, 
  just under one year later than originally planned, the A-12 officially lifted 
  her wheels from the runway. Piloted again by Louis Schalk, it took off at 
  170 knots, with a gross weight of 72,000 pounds and climbed to 30,000'. 
  Top speed was 340 knots and the flight lasted 59 minutes. The pilot 
  reported that the aircraft responded well and was extremely stable. 
  Kelly Johnson declared it to be the smoothest official first flight of any 
  aircraft he had designed or tested. The aircraft broke the sound barrier 
  on its second official flight, 4 May 62  reaching Mach 1.1. Again only minor 
  problems were reported. 
  (S) With these flights accomplished, jubilation was the order of the day. 
  New Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. John McCone, sent a telegram 
  congratulating Kelly Johnson. A critical phase had triumphantly passed, 
  but there remained the long, difficult and sometimes discouraging process 
  of working the aircraft up to full operational performance.
  
  
  Braking would be by a drouge chute
  (C) Aircraft No. 122 arrived at base on 26 June, & spent three months in
  radar testing before engine installations and final assembly. Aircraft #123
  arrived in August and flew in October. Aircraft #124, a two-seated version
  intended for use in training project pilots, was delivered in November. 
  It was powered by the J-58 engines, but delivery delays and a desire to
  begin pilot training prompted a decision to install the smaller J-75's. The
  trainer (SR71B/A-12B) flew initially in January 1963. The fifth aircraft, 
  Number 125, arrived at the area on 17 December. (S) Meanwhile the
  OXCART program received a shot in the arm from the Cuban missile crisis.
  U-2's had been maintaining a regular reconnaissance vigil over the island
  and it was on one of these missions in October that the presence of
  offensive missiles was discovered. Over flights thereafter became more
  frequent, but on 27 October an Agency U-2, flown by a Strategic Air Force
  pilot on a SAC directed mission, was shot down by a surface-to-air missile.
  This raised the dismaying possibility that continued manned, high- altitude  
  surveillance of Cuba might become out of the question. The Oxcart program
  suddenly assumed greater significance than ever, and its achievement of
  operational status became one of the highest national priorities.  
  (S) At the end of 1962 there were two A-12 aircraft engaged in flight tests.
  A speed of Mach 2.16 and altitude of 60,000 feet had been achieved.
  Progress was still slow, however, because of delays in the delivery of engines
  and shortcomings in the performance of those delivered. One of the two test
  birds was still flying with two J-75 engines and the other with one a J-75 and
  a J-58. It had become clear that Pratt & Whitney had been too optimistic in
  their forecast; the problem of developing the J-58 up to OXCART then 
  specifications had proved a good deal more recalcitrant than expected. Mr.
  McCone judged the situation to be truly serious, and on 3 December he wrote
  to the President of United Aircraft Corporation. (U) "I have been advised
  that J-58 engine deliveries have been delayed again due to engine control
  production problems....By the end of the year it appears we will have barely
  enough J-58 engines to support the flight test program adequately. Due to 
  various engine difficulties we have not yet reached design speed and altitude.
  Engine thrust and fuel consumption deficiencies at present prevent sustained
  flight at design conditions which is necessary to complete developments.
  
  (U) By the end of  January 1963, ten engines were available, and the first
  flight with two of them installed occurred on 15 January. Thenceforth all
  A-12 aircraft were fitted with their intended propulsion system. Flight testing
  accelerated and contractor personnel went to a three-shift work day. (U) With
  each succeeding step into a high Mach regime new problems presented
  themselves. The worst of all these difficulties, indeed one of the most
  formidable in the entire history of the program was revealed when flight testing
  moved into speeds between Mach 2.4 & 2.8. The aircraft experienced such
  severe roughness so as to make its operation  virtually out of the question. 
  The trouble was diagnosed as being in the air inlet system, which  its controls
  admitted air to the engine. At the higher speeds the flow of air was uneven and
  the engine therefore could not function properly. Only after a long period of
  experimentation, often highly frustrating and irritating was a solution reached.
  This further got postponed when the A-12 could be declared operationally ready.  
  
  (U) Among more mundane troubles was the discovery that various nuts, bolts,
  clamps, and other debris of the manufacturing process had not been cleared **
  away, and upon engine run up or even take-off were sucked into the engine.
  The engine parts were machined to such close tolerances that they could be
  ruined in this fashion. Obviously the fault was due to sheer carelessness.
  Inspection procedures were revised and it was also found prudent at Burbank
  to hoist the engine nacelles into the air, rock them back and forth, listen for
  loose objects, and then remove them by hand.  
  
  (** This footnote did NOT appear in the original document. It is the method I
  will use to indicate marginal notes that were hand written, at the location of
  in the original document. The marginal note states: hasn't changed) 
  
  (S) While on a routine flight, 24 May 1963, one of the detachment pilots
  recognized an erroneous and confusing air speed indication and decided to
  eject from the aircraft, which crashed 14 miles south of Wendover, Utah. The
  pilot Kenneth Collins, was unhurt. The wreckage was recovered in two days
  and  persons at the scene were identified and requested to sign secrecy
  agreements.  A cover story for the press described the accident as an F-105
  and is still listed in this way on official USAF accident records.
  
  (U) All A-12 aircraft were grounded for a week during investigation of the
  accident. A plugged pitot static tube in icing conditions turned out to be
  responsible for the faulty cockpit instrument indications. It was not something
  would hold things up for long.   (S) The loss of this aircraft nevertheless
  precipitated a policy problem which had been troubling the Agency for some
  time. With the growing number of A-12's, how much longer could the project
  remain secret? The program had gone through development, construction and
  a year of flight testing  by now without attracting public attention. But then
  the  Department of Defense was having difficulty in concealing its participation 
  because of the increasing rate of expenditures, otherwise unexplained. There
  was a realization that the technological data would be extremely valuable in
  connection with feasibility studies for the SST. Finally, there was a growing
  awareness in the higher reaches of the aircraft industry that something new
  and remarkable was going on. Rumors spread, and gossip flew about. 
  Commercial airline crews sighted the OXCART in flight. The editor of Aviation
  Week (as might be expected) indicated his knowledge of developments at
  Burbank airport seemed 'very hush-hush.'    The secrecy was thinning out.
  
               (S)  The PRESIDENT'S  ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE FLOCK
            
       Family Blackbird Gathering
  
  (U) In spite of all this, 1963 went by without any public revelation. President
  Johnson was brought up to date on the project a week after taking office and 
  directed that a paper be prepared for an announcement in the spring of
  1964. Then at President Johnson's press conference on 24 Feb '64, he read
  a statement the first paragraph was as follows:
  (U) "The United States has successfully developed an advanced experimental 
  jet aircraft, the A-12, which has been tested in sustained flight at more than 
  2,000 miles per hour & at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. The performance
  of A-12's will far exceed that of any other aircraft in the world today. The 
  development of this aircraft has been made possible by major advances in
  aircraft technology of great significance for both military and commercial
  applications. Several A-12 aircraft are now being flight tested at Edwards AFB
  in California. The existence of this program is being disclosed today to permit
  orderly exploitation of this advanced technology in our military and commercial
  program."
  
  (U)  The president went on to mention the "mastery of the metallurgy and
  fabrication of titanium metal," gave credit to Lockheed and Pratt & Whitney,
  remarked that appropriate members of the Senate and House had been kept
  fully informed, and prescribed that the detailed performance the A-12 would
  be kept strictly classified. 
  (S) The President's reference to the "A-12" was of course deliberate. "A-11"
  had been the original design designation for the all-metal aircraft 1st proposed
  by Lockheed; subsequently it became the design designation for the Air Force
  YF-12A interceptor which differed from its parent mainly in that it carried a
  second man for launching air to air missiles. To preserve the distinction between
  the A-11 and the A-12 Security had briefed practically all witting personnel in
  government and industry on the impending announcement. OXCART secrecy
  continued in effect. Considerable speculation about the Agency role in the
  development was told, but it was never acknowledged by the government.
  News headlines ranged from "US has dozen A-11 jets already flying" to
  "Secret of sizzling new plane probably history's best kept."
    (U) The President also said that "the A-11 aircraft now at Edwards Air Force
  Base are undergoing extensive tests to determine their capabilities as long
  range interceptors." It was true that the Air Force in October 1960, had
  contracted for three interceptor versions of the A-12 & they were by this time
  available. But at the moment when the President spoke, there were no A-11's
  at Edwards & there never had been. Project officials had known that the public
  announcement was about to be made, but they had not been told exactly when.
  Caught by surprise, they hastily flew two Air Force YF-12A's to Edwards to
  support the President's statement. So rushed was this operation, so speedily
  were the aircraft put into hangars upon arrival, that heat activated the hangar
  sprinkler system, dousing the guests which awaited the planes.  
  (S) Thenceforth, while the OXCART continued its secret career at its own site,
  the A-11 performed at Edwards Air Force Base in a considerable glare of publicity.
  Pictures of the aircraft appeared in the press, correspondents could look at it and
  marvel, stories could be written. Virtually no details were made available, but the
  technical journals nevertheless had a field day. The unclassified Air Force and
  Space Digest, for example, published a long article in its issue of April 1964,
  commencing: "The official pictures and statements tell very little about the A-11.
  But the technical literature from open sources, when carefully interpreted, tells
  a good deal about what it could and, more importantly, what it could not be.  
     
  Here's the story ...
                           (S) Going Operational
  
  Aircraft Design By Kelly Johnson,
  Engine Housing Design by Ben Rich
  (U) Three years and seven months after first flight in April 1962 the Oxcart
  was declared ready for operational use at design specifications. The period 
  thus devoted to flight tests was remarkably short, considering the new fields 
  of aircraft performance which were being explored. As each higher Mach 
  number was reached exhaustive tests were carried out in accordance with 
  standard procedures to ensure that the aircraft functioned properly and 
  safely. Defects were corrected and improvements made. All concerned 
  gained experience with the characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the vehicle.  
  
  (S) The air inlet and related control continued for a long time to present the 
  most troublesome and refractory problem. Numerous attempts failed to find a 
  remedy, even though a special task force concentrated on the task. For a time 
  there was something approaching despair, and the solution when finally 
  achieved was greeted with enormous relief. After all, not every experimental 
  aircraft of advanced performance has survived its flight testing period. The 
  possibility existed that OXCART also would fail, despite the great cost and 
  effort expended upon it. (S) A few dates and figures will serve to mark the 
  progress of events. By the end of 1963 there had been 573 flights totaling 765 
  hours. Nine aircraft were in the inventory. On 20 July 1963 test aircraft flew 
  for the first time at Mach 3; in November Mach 3.2 (the design speed) was 
  reached at 78,000 feet altitude. The longest sustained flight at design conditions 
  occurred on 3 February 1964; it lasted to ten minutes at Mach 3.2 and 83,000
  feet. By the end of 1964 there had been 1,160 flights, totaling 1,616 hours. 
  Eleven aircraft were available, 4 for testing & 7 assigned to the detachment. 
  (C) The record may be put in another way. Mach 2 was reached after six months 
  of flying; Mach 3 after 15 months. Two years after the first flight the aircraft had 
  flown a total of 38 hours at Mach 2, three hours at Mach 2.6, and less than one 
  hour at Mach 3. After three years, Mach 2 time had increased to 60 hours, Mach 
  2.6 time time to 33 hours, and Mach 3 time to nine hours; all Mach 3 time,
  however, was by test aircraft, and detachment aircraft were still restricted to
  Mach 2.9. 
  (S) As may be seen from the figures, most flights were of short duration,
  averaging little more than an hour each. Primarily this was because longer
  flights were unnecessary at this stage of testing. It was also true, however,
  that the less seen of OXCART the better and short flights helped to preserve
  the secrecy of the proceedings. Yet it was virtually impossible for an aircraft
  of such dimensions and capabilities to remain inconspicuous. 
  At its full speed OXCART had a turning radius of no less than 86 miles.  
  There was no question of staying close to the airfield; its shortest possible
  flights took it over a very large expanse of territory.
  (S) The first long-range, high-speed flight occurred on 27 January 1965,
  when one of the test aircraft flew for an hour and forty minutes, with an hour
  and fifteen minutes above Mach 3.1. Its total range was 2,580 nautical miles,
  with altitudes between 75,600 and 80,000 feet. (U) Two more aircraft were
  lost during this phase of the program. On 9 July 1964 Aircraft No. 133 was
  making its final approach to the runway, at altitude of 500 feet & airspeed of
  200 knots it began a smooth steady roll to the left. Lockheed test pilot Bill
  Park could not overcome the roll. At about a 45 degree bank angle and 200
  foot altitude he ejected. As he swung down to the vertical in the parachute
  his feet touched the ground, for what must have been one of the narrower
  escapes in the perilous history of test piloting. The primary cause of the
  accident was that the servo for the right outboard roll & pitch control froze.
  No news of the accident filtered out.
  (S) On 28 December 1965 Aircraft No.126 crashed immediately after take 
  off and was totally destroyed. Detachment pilot Mele Vojvodich ejected safely 
  at an altitude of 150 feet. The accident investigation board determined that a 
  flight line electrician had improperly connected the yaw and pitch gyros had 
  in effect reversed the controls. This time Mr. McCone directed the Office of 
  Security to conduct an investigation into the possibility of sabotage. While 
  nothing of the sort was discovered, there were indications of negligence, as 
  the manufacturer of the gyro had earlier warned of the possibility that the 
  mechanism could be connected in reverse. No action had been taken, however, 
  even by such an elementary precaution as painting the contacts different colors. 
  Again there was no publicity connected with the accident.  
  (S) The year 1965 saw the test site reach the high point of activity. Completion 
  of construction brought it to full physical size. All detachment pilots were Mach 
  3.0 qualified. Site population reached 1,835. Contractors were working three 
  shifts a day. Private Lockheed Constellations made daily flights between the 
  factory at Burbank and the site. Two C-47 flights a day were made between the 
  site and Las Vegas. And officials were considering how and when and where to 
  use OXCART in its appointed role.
                        (S) Targeting the OX
  
  (S) After the unhappy end of U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, US political
  authorities were understandably cautious about committing themselves to 
  further manned reconnaissance over unfriendly territory. There was no 
  serious intention to use the OXCART over Russia; save in some
  unforeseeable emergency it was indeed no longer necessary to do so.
  What then, should be done with this vehicle?  
  
  (S) The first interest was in Cuba. By early 1964 Project Headquarters
  began planning for the contingency of flights over Cuba under a program
  designated SKYLARK. Bill Park's accident in early July held this program
  up for a time, but on 5 August Acting DCI Marshall Carter directed that
  SKYLARK achieve emergency operational readiness by 5 November. This
  involved preparing a small detachment which should be able to do the job
  over Cuba, though at something less than full design capability of the
  OXCART.        The goal was to operate at Mach 2.8 and 80,000' 
  (C) In order to meet the deadline set by General Carter, camera performance
  would have to be validated, pilots qualified for Mach 2.8 flight & co-ordination
  with supporting elements arranged. 
  (TS) The special cameras were a quiet revolution break through thanks to the
  R&D department of Polaroid and its adjoining facility on the campus of MIT.
  These units would remain classified for the longest time, in fact some parts
  are classified to this day, over 40 years later. Only one of several for
  electronic countermeasures  (ECM) would be ready by November and a
  senior intra-governmental group, including some representation from the
  President's Scientific Advisory Committee, examined the problem of operating
  over Cuba without the full complement of defensive systems. 
  
  This panel decided that the first few over flights could safely be conducted
  without them, but the ECM would be necessary thereafter. The delivery
  schedule of ECM equipment was compatible with this course of action.  
  
  (S) After considerable modifications to aircraft, the detachment simulated 
  Cuban missions on training flights, and a limited emergency SKYLARK 
  capability was announced on the date General Carter had set. With 2 weeks 
  notice the OXCART detachment could accomplish a Cuban over flight, even 
  though with fewer ready aircraft and pilots than had been planned. 
  
  (S) During the following weeks the detachment concentrated on developing
  SKYLARK into a sustained capability, with five ready pilots & five operational
  aircraft. The main tasks were to determine aircraft range and fuel consumption,
  attain repeatable reliable operation, finish pilot training, prepare a family of
  SKYLARK missions, and coordinate routes with North American Air Defense,
  Continental Air Defense, and the Federal Aviation Authority. All this was
  accomplished without substantially hindering the main task of working up
  OXCART to full design capability. We may anticipate the story, however, by
  remarking that despite all this preparation the OXCART was never used over
   Cuba. U-2's proved adequate.  A-12 was for more critical situations. 
  
  (S) In 1965 a more critical situation did indeed emerge in Asia, and interest in 
  using the aircraft there began to be manifest. On 18 March 1965 Mr. McCone 
  discussed with Secretaries McNamara and Vance the increasing hazards to
  U-2 and drone reconnaissance of Communist China. A memorandum of this
  conversation stated:
  (S) "It was further agreed that we should proceed immediately with all 
  preparatory steps necessary to operate the OXCART over Communist China
  and have them flying out of Okinawa at Kadena Air Base. It was agreed that
  we should proceed with all construction & related arrangements. However,
  this decision did not authorize the deployment of the OXCART to Okinawa
  nor the decision to fly the OXCART over Communist China. The  next 
  scheduled rotation  decision would authorize all preparatory steps and the 
  expenditure of such funds as might be involved. No decision has been taken
  to fly the OXCART operationally over Communist China. This decision can
  only be made by the President." (S) Four days later Brigadier General Jack C.
  Ledford, Director of the Office of Special Activities, DD/S&T, briefed Mr. Vance 
  on the scheme which had been drawn up for operations in the Far East.
  
  (TS) The project was called BLACK SHIELD and it called for the OXCART to
  operate out of the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa. In the first phase, 3
  aircraft would stage to Okinawa for 60-day periods, twice a year, with about
  225 personnel involved.  
  
  (S) After this was in good order, BLACK SHIELD would advance to the point 
  of maintaining a permanent detachment at Kadena. Secretary Vance made 
  $3.7 million available to be spent in providing support facilities on the island, 
  which were to be available by early fall of 1965. 
  
  (S) Meanwhile the Communists began to deploy surface-to-air missiles around
  Hanoi, thereby threatening our current military reconnaissance capabilities.
  Then Secretary McNamara called this to the attention of the Under Secretary
  of the Air Force on 3 June 1965 & inquired about the practicability of substituting
  OXCART aircraft for U-2's. He was told that BLACK SHIELD could operate over
  Vietnam as soon as there was adequate aircraft and the expected performance
  was achieved.
  (S) With deployment overseas thus apparently impending in the fall, the
  detachment went into the final stages of its program for validating the reliability 
  of aircraft and aircraft systems. It set out to demonstrate systems reliability at
  Mach 3.05 and at 2,300 nautical miles range, with penetration altitude 76,000'.
  A capability for three aerial refuelings was also part of the validation process.
  
  (S) By this time the OXCART was well along in performance. The inlet, camera, 
  hydraulic, navigation and flight control systems all demonstrated acceptable
  reliability. Nevertheless, as longer flights were conducted at high speeds and 
  high temperatures, new problems came to the surface, the most serious being 
  with the electrical wiring system. Wiring connectors and components had to
  withstand temperatures of more than 800 degrees Fahrenheit, together with
  structural flexing, vibration, and shock. Continuing malfunctions in the inlet
  controls, communications equipment, ECM systems, and cockpit instruments 
  were in many cases attributable to wiring failures. There was also disturbing
  evidence that careless handling contributed to electrical connector failures.
  Difficulties persisted in the sealing of fuel tanks. What with one thing and 
  another, officials soon began to fear that the scheduled date for Black Shield
  readiness would not be met. Prompt corrective action on the part of Lockheed 
  was in order. The quality of maintenance needed drastic improvement.
  The responsibility for delivering an aircraft system with acceptable reliability
  to meet an operational commitment lay in Lockheed's hands.
  
  (S) In this uncomfortable situation, John Paragosky, Deputy for Technology, 
  OSA, went to the Lockheed plant to see Kelly Johnson on 3 Aug 1965. A frank
  discussion ensued on the measures necessary to insure that BLACK SHIELD
  commitments would be met, and Johnson concluded that he should himself
  spend full time at the site in order to get the job done expeditiously. Lockheed
  President Dan Haughton offered the full support of the corporation & Johnson
  began duty the next day. Effective management got Project BLACK SHIELD
  back on schedule.  

  • 
                         Habu pilots would wear...   Astronaut Wings
    
    (S) Four primary Black Shield aircraft were selected & final validation flights
    conducted. During these tests the OXCART achieved a maximum speed of
    Mach 3.29, altitude of 90,000 feet & sustained flight time above Mach 3.2 of
    one hour and fourteen minutes. 
    The maximum endurance flight lasted six hours and twenty minutes. The last 
    stage was reached on 20 November 1965, and two days later Kelly Johnson
     wrote General Ledford: 
    (S) " ... Over all, my considered opinion is that the aircraft can be successfully
    deployed for the BLACK SHIELD mission with what I would consider to be at
    least as low a degree of risk as in the early U-2 deployment days. Actually,
    considering our performance level of more than four times the U-2 speed and
    three miles more operating altitude, it is probably much less risky than our 1st
    U-2 deployment. I think the time has come when the bird should leave its nest."
    
    (S) Ten days later 303 Committee received a formal proposal that OXCART be
    deployed to the Far East. The committee, after examining the matter, did not
    approve. It did agree,  that short of actually moving aircraft to Kadena AFB, all
    steps should be taken to develop and maintain a quick reaction capability,
    ready to deploy within a 21-day period at any time after 1 Jan 1966. 
    
    (S) There the matter remained, for more than a year. During 1966 there were
    frequent renewals of the request to the 303 Committee for authorization to
    deploy OXCART to Okinawa and conduct reconnaissance missions over
    North Vietnam, Communist China, or both. All were turned down. Among high
    officials there was difference of opinion; CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
    Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board favored the move, while
    Alexis Johnson representing State and Defense in the persons of Messrs.
    McNamara and Vance, opposed it. The proponents urged the necessity of 
    better intelligence, especially on a possible Chinese Communist build-up
    preparatory to intervention in Vietnam. The opponents felt that better
    intelligence was not so urgently needed as to justify the political risks of
    basing the aircraft in Okinawa and thus almost certainly disclosing to
    Japanese and other propagandists. They also really believed it was very 
    undesirable to use OXCART and wind up  revealing something of its secret
    capability until a more pressing requirement appeared. At least once, on
    12 August 1966, the divergent views were brought up to the President, who
    confirmed 303 Committee's majority opinion against deployment. 
    
    (S) Meanwhile, of course, flight testing and crew proficiency training continued.
    There was plenty of time to improve mission plans and flight tactics, as well as
    to prepare the forward area at Kadena. New plans shortened deployment time
    from the 21 days first specified. Personnel and cargo were to be airlifted to
    Kadena AB the day deployment was approved. On the 5th day the first OXCART
    would depart and travel the 6,673 miles in five hours & 34 minutes. The second
    would go on the seventh and the third on the 9th day. The first two would be
    ready for an emergency mission on the eleventh day, and for a normal mission
    on the fifteenth day. (S) An impressive demonstration of the Oxcart's capability
    occurred on 21 December 1966 when Lockheed test pilot Bill Park flew 10,198
    statute miles in six hours. The aircraft left the test area in Nevada & flew north 
    ward over Yellowstone National Park, then eastward to Bismarck, North Dakota
    and on to Duluth, Minnesota.   It then turned south and passed Atlanta en route
    to Tampa, Florida, northwest to Portland, Oregon, then southwest to Nevada.
    The flight turned eastward, passing Denver & Omaha. Turning around at St.
    Louis and on over to Knoxville, Tennessee, it then passed  Memphis in the home
    stretch back to Nevada. 
    This flight established a record unapproachable by any other aircraft; it began
    at the same time a typical government employee starts his work day and ended
    two hours before his quitting time. 
    
    * (S) Shortly after this exploit, tragedy befell the program. During a routine
    training flight on 5 January 1967, the fourth aircraft was lost, together with its
    pilot. The accident occurred during descent about 70 miles from the base. A
    fuel gauge failed to function properly, and the aircraft ran out of fuel only
    minutes before landing. The pilot, Walter Ray, ejected but was killed when he
    failed to separate from the ejection seat before impact. The aircraft was
    totally destroyed. Its wreckage was found on 6 January and Ray's body
    recovered a day later. Through Air Force channels a story was released to the 
    effect that an AF SR-71, on a routine test flight out of Edwards AFB, was
    missing and presumed down in Nevada. The pilot was identified as a civilian
    test pilot and newspapers connected him with Lockheed. Flight activity at the
    base was again suspended during investigation of the causes both for the
    crash and for the failure of the seat separation device.
    (S) It's worth observing that none of the 4 accidents occurred in the high
    Mach numbers or high temperature regime of flight. All involved traditional
    problems inherent in any aircraft. In fact, the OXCART was by this time
    performing at high speeds, with excellent reliability.
                                                (S) BLACK SHIELD
    (S) About May of 1967 prospects for deployment took a new turn. A good deal of 
    apprehension was evident in Washington about the possibility the Communists might 
    introduce surface-to-surface missiles into North Vietnam & concern was aggravated 
    by doubts as to whether we could detect such a development if it occurred.   The 
    President asked for a proposal on the matter; CIA briefed the 303 Committee and 
    once again suggested that the OXCART be used. Its camera was far superior to 
    those on drones or on the U-2, its vulnerability was far less. The State and Defense 
    members of the Committee decided to re-examine the requirements and the political 
    risks involved. While they were engaged in their deliberations, Director of Central 
    Intelligence, Richard Helms, submitted to the 303 Committee another formal proposal 
    to deploy the OXCART. In addition, he raised the matter at Pres. Johnson's "Tuesday 
    lunch" on 16 May, and received the Presidents approval.  Walt Rostow later in the
    day formally conveyed the President's decision and the BLACK SHIELD deployment
    plan was forthwith put into effect. 
    
    (S) On 17 May airlift to Kadena began.  22 May the first A-12 (Serial No. 131) flew 
    onstop to Kadena in six hours and six minutes. Aircraft Number 127 
    
      (TS) * Neither on this nor on other flights was there much trouble from sonic boom. 
    To be sure, the inhabitants of a small village some 30 miles from the site were
    troubled as the aircraft broke through the sound barrier while gaining altitude. A
    change of course remedied this. At altitude OXCART produced no more than an
    ominous rumble on the ground and since the plane was invisible to the naked eye
    no one associated this sound with its actual source. 
    (C) departed on 24 May and arrived at Kadena five hours and 55 minutes later. The 
    third, No. 129, left according to plan on 26 May 1967 & proceeded normally until in 
    the vicinity of Wake Island where the pilot experienced difficulties with the inertial 
    navigation and communications systems. In the circumstances, he decided to make
    a precautionary landing at Wake Island. The prepositioned emergency recovery team 
    secured the aircraft without incident and the flight to Kadena resumed next day.
    (C) Arrangements were made to brief the Ambassadors and Chiefs of Station in the 
    Philippines, Formosa, Thailand, South Vietnam, Japan, and the High Commissioner 
    and Chief of Station, Okinawa. The Prime Ministers of Japan and Thailand were 
    advised, as were the President and Defense Minister of the Republic of China. The 
    Chiefs of the Air Force of Thailand and the Republic of China were also briefed. 
    Reactions were favorable. 
    (S) On 29 May 1967, the unit at Kadena was ready to fly an operational mission. 
    Under the command of Colonel Hugh C. Slater two hundred and sixty personnel 
    had deployed to the BLACK SHIELD facility. Except for hangars, which were a 
    month short of completion, everything was in shape for sustained operations. 
    Next day the detachment was alerted for a mission on 31 May, and the moment 
    arrived which would see the culmination of ten years of effort, worry, and cost. 
    As fate would have it, on the morning of the 31st heavy rain fell at Kadena. Since 
    weather over the target area was clear, preparations continued in hopes that 
    the local weather would clear. When the time for take-off approached, OXCART, 
    which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway, and took off while 
    the rain continued.
    (S) The first BLACK SHIELD mission followed one flight line over North Vietnam 
    and one over the Demilitarized Zone. It lasted three hours and 39 minutes and 
    the cruise legs were flown at Mach 3.1 and 80,000 feet. Results were very 
    satisfactory. Seventy of the 190 known SAM sites in North Vietnam were 
    photographed, as were nine other priority targets. There were no radar signals 
    detected, indicating that the first mission had gone completely unnoticed by 
    both Chinese and North Vietnamese.
    (S) Fifteen BLACK SHIELD missions were alerted during the period from 31 
    May to 15 August 1967. Seven of the fifteen were flown and of these four 
    detected radar tracking signals, but no hostile action was taken against any 
    of them. By mid-July they had determined with a high degree of confidence 
    that there were no surface-to-surface missiles in North Vietnam.  
    (C) All operational missions were planned, directed, and controlled by Project 
    Headquarters in Washington. A constant watch was maintained on the weather 
    in the target areas. Each day at a specified hour (1600 hours local) a mission 
    alert briefing occurred. If the forecast weather appeared favorable, the 
    Kadena base was alerted and provided a route to be flown. The alert preceded 
    actual take-off by 28 to 30 hours. Twelve hours prior to take-off (H minus 12) a 
    second review of target weather was made. If it continued favorable, the mission 
    generation sequence continued. At H minus 2 hours, a "go-no-go" decision was 
    made and communicated to the field. The final decision, depended not solely on 
    weather in the target area; conditions had to be propitious also in the refueling 
    areas and at the launch and recovery base. 
    (S) Operations and maintenance at Kadena began with the receipt of an alert 
    notification. Both a primary aircraft & pilot and a back-up aircraft and pilot were 
    selected. The aircraft were given thorough inspection and servicing, all systems 
    were checked, and the cameras loaded into the aircraft. Pilots received a detailed  
    route briefing in the early evening prior to the day of flight. On the morning of the 
    flight a final briefing occurred, at which time the condition of the aircraft and its 
    systems was reported, last-minute weather forecasts reviewed, & other relevant
    intelligence communicated together with any amendments or changes in the flight 
    plan. Two hours prior to take- off the primary pilot had a medical examination, got 
    into his suit, and was taken to the aircraft. If any malfunctions developed on the 
    primary aircraft, the back-up could execute the mission one hour later.  
    (S) A typical route profile for a BLACK SHIELD mission over North Vietnam
    included a refueling shortly after take-off, south of Okinawa, the planned 
    photographic pass or passes, withdrawal to a second aerial refueling in the
    Thailand area and return to Kadena. So great was the Oxcart's speed that it spent
    only 12 1/2 minutes over North Vietnam in a typical "single pass" mission, or a
    total of 21 1/2 minutes on two passes. Its turning radius of 86 miles was such,
    however, that on some mission profiles it might be forced during its turn to intrude
    into actual Chinese airspace. 
    (S) Once landed back at Kadena AB, the camera film was removed from the
    aircraft, boxed, and sent by special plane to the processing facilities. Film from
    earlier missions was developed at the Eastman Kodak plant in Rochester, NY.
    By late summer an Air Force Center in Japan carried out the processing in order 
    to place the photo intelligence in thehands of American commanders in Vietnam
    with in 24 hours of completion of a BLACK SHIELD mission.
    
    (S) Between 16 August and 31 December 1967, 26 missions were alerted. Fifteen 
    were flown. On 17 December one SAM site tracked the vehicle with its acquisition
    radar but was unsuccessful with its Fan Song guidance radar.  On 28 October a
    North Vietnamese SAM site for the first time launched a single albeit unsuccessful,
    missile at the OXCART. Photography from this mission documented the event with
    photographs of missile smoke above the SAM firing site, and with pictures of the
    missile and of its contrail. Electronic countermeasures equipment appeared to
    perform well against the missile firing.
    
    (S) During the flight of 30 October 1967, pilot Dennis Sullivan detected radar
    tracking on his first pass over North Vietnam. Two sites prepared to launch 
    missiles but neither did. During the second pass at least six missiles were fired 
    at the OXCART, each confirmed by missile vapor trails on mission photography.
    Sullivan saw these vapor trails and witnessed three missile detonations.  Post
    flight inspection of the aircraft revealed that a piece of metal had penetrated 
    the lower right wing fillet area and lodged against the support structure of the
    wing tank. The fragment was not a war head pellet but, may have been part of
    the debris from one of the missile detonations observed by the pilot.
    
    (S) Between 1 January and 31 March 1968 six missions were flown out of fifteen 
    alerted. Four of these were over North Vietnam and two over North Korea. The
    first mission over North Korea on 26 Jan occurred during a very tense period
    following seizure of the Pueblo on the 23rd. The aim was to discover whether the
    North Koreans were preparing any large scale hostile move on the heels of this
    incident. Chinese tracking of the flight was apparent, but no missiles were fired
    at the Blackbird plane. 
    (C) The Department of State was reluctant to endorse a second mission over North 
    Korea for fear of the diplomatic repercussions which could be expected if the aircraft 
    came down in hostile territory. BG Paul Bacalis then briefed Secretary Rusk on the 
    details and objectives of the mission, and assured him that the aircraft would transit 
    North Korea in no more than seven minutes. He explained that even if some failure 
    occurred during flight the aircraft would be highly unlikely to land either in North
    Korea or in China. Secretary Rusk made suggestions to alter the flight plan, thus
    becoming the projects highest ranking flight planner. (S) Between 1 April and 9
    June 1968 two missions were alerted for North Korea. Only the mission which flew
    on 8 May was granted approval.
                         (S) SR-71 Replaces the A-12
    
    50th Anniversary Golden Air Tatoo, Nellis AFB on April '97 Flyby
    plus one on static display!  A sight Never to be repeated !
    (S) All through the OXCART program the Air Force had been exceedingly 
    helpful. it gave financial support, conducted the refueling program, provided
    operational facilities at Kadena AB, and airlifted OXCART personnel and
    supplies to Okinawa for the operations over Vietnam and North Korea. It 
    also ordered from Lockheed a small fleet of A-11's, which upon being
    finished as two seated reconnaissance aircraft would be named SR-71.
    These became operational about 1967. 
    
    (S) The stated mission of the SR-71 was to conduct "post-strike
    reconnaissance," that is, to look the enemy situation over after a nuclear 
    exchange. The likelihood of using the aircraft in the capacity hardly appeared
    great, but SR-71 was of course also capable of ordinary intelligence missions. 
    For these purposes, the OXCART possessed certain clear advantages. 
    It carried only one man and largely for this reason it had room for a much bigger
    and better camera, as well as for various other collection devices which at the
    time could not be carried by the SR-71. It was certainly the most effective
    reconnaissance aircraft in existence, or likely to be in existence for years to 
    come. Also it was operated by civilians, and could be employed covertly, 
    or at least without the number of personnel and amount of fanfare normally 
    attending an Air Force operation.
    
    (S) The fact the SR-71's were ordered eased the path of OXCART
    development, since it meant that the financial burden was shared
    with the Air Force, and the cost per aircraft was reduced by producing
    greater numbers. In the longer run, however, the existence of SR-71
    spelled the doom of OXCART, for reasons which appear to have been
    chiefly financial and in a manner now to be related.
    
                         (S) The Demise of a Pioneering Aircraft
    
    (S) During November 1965, the very month when OXCART was finally
    declared operational, the  moves toward its demise commenced. Within
    the Bureau of the Budget a memorandum was circulated expressing
    concern at the costs of the A-12 and SR-71 programs, both past and 
    projected.  It questioned the requirement for the total number of
    aircraft represented in the combined fleets, and doubted the necessity
    for a separate CIA Oxcart fleet. Several alternatives were proposed to
    achieve a substantial reduction in the forecasted spending, but the
    recommended course was to phase out the A-12 program by September
    1966 and stop any further procurement of SR-71 aircraft. Copies of this
    memorandum were sent to the DOD & the CIA with the suggestion that
    those agencies explore the alternatives set out in the paper. The
    Secretary of Defense declined to consider the proposal, because the
    SR-71 wouldn't be operational by Sept 1966.
    
    (S) Things remained in this state until in July 1966 the Bureau of the
    Budget proposed that a study group be established to look into the
    possibility of reducing expenses on the OXCART and SR-71 programs.
    The group was requested to consider the following alternatives:
    
    1. Retention of separate A-12 and SR-71 fleets, i.e., status quo.
    2. Collocation of the two fleets.
    3. Transfer of the OXCART mission and aircraft to SAC.
    4. Transfer of the OXCART mission to SAC and storage of A-12 aircraft.
    5. Transfer of the OXCART mission to SAC and disposal of all A-12 aircraft
    
    (S)The study group included C. W. Fischer, Bureau of the Budget; Herbert Bennington,
    Department of Defense; and John Paragosky, CIA. (S) This group conducted its study
    through the fall of 1966 and identified three principal alternatives of its own. They were: